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ABSTRACT 
 
The on-farm production of switchgrass has been given considerable attention by farmers, 
policymakers and others.  However, because the switchgrass market is not developed yet, most 
of the research only focuses on the switchgrass breakeven cost.  The appropriate price combining 
interests of both the biorefinery and the farmers, or the contract price, has not been given enough 
attention. 
Two types of contractual relationships are discussed in this thesis: Capacity Procurement 
Contract (CPC, per acre contract) and Tonnage Contract (TC, per ton contract).  The contract 
prices of switchgrass under these two types of contracts are estimated in this analysis.  Because 
the land quality and soil type also affect the yield and average cost of switchgrass production and 
corn production, the type of landscape also affects the contract price of switchgrass.  Using west 
Tennessee as a case study, contract prices under four types of landscapes are analyzed: (i) a well-
drained level upland (WDLU), (ii) a well- to moderately well-drained floodplain (WDFP), (iii) a 
moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland (MDSU), (iv) a poorly drained 
floodplain (PDFP).  This research suggests that the MDSU land is the top choice for the 
biorefinery.  Under the capacity procurement contract, the switchgrass contract price on MDSU 
land is $474 per acre.  Under the tonnage contract, the switchgrass contract price on MDSU land 
is estimated to be $77 per ton.  Compared to the capacity procurement contract, a tonnage 
contract is preferred by the biorefinery because the tonnage contract has more post contract risk 
advantage than the capacity procurement contract with regard to the unexpected change in 
switchgrass yield. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Biofuel has been in use in many countries around the world.  For example, a high blend 
of ethanol and gasoline has been in use in Brazil for more than 30 years.  Bioethanol was broadly 
introduced in Sweden in 2005 (Pacini and Silveira 2010).  In the United States (US), concerns 
about the high dependency on imported oil and the environmental costs of fossil fuels are the 
main drivers of research on bioenergy (McLaughlin et al. 1999).   
Farmers, policymakers and others have shown great interest in the on-farm production of 
biomass for ethanol production (English et al. 2006).  The Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007 requires that 36 billion gallons of biofuel be produced from renewable sources 
within the US by 2022.  About 6% of US corn is used to produce approximately 1 billion gallons 
of ethanol each year.  However, this raises the ethical question with regard to the world shortage 
of food.  Moreover, considering the continuously increasing price of corn, it is unlikely that corn 
can supply more than 2 billion to 2.5 billion gallons of ethanol annually in the future 
(McLaughlin et al. 1999).   
Switchgrass has been identified as the model biomass feedstock for the biofuel industry 
to produce cellulosic ethanol based on the extensive research by the Bioenergy Feedstock 
Development Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (McLaughlin et al. 1999; Fuentes 
and Taliaferro 2002; Epplin et al. 2007).  It is a warm season, perennial grass that can grow to 
more than 2.75 meters in height and its rooting system can extend up to 3 meters in depth 
(Jensen et al. 2007).  Switchgrass has a yield of 13.5-17.9 Mg per hector or 6-8 short tons per 
acre in the southeastern US (Bouton 2002; Maposse et al. 1995).  It can be planted in May 
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through early June and harvested annually using regular hay equipment (Jensen et al. 2007).  
Switchgrass has the greatest potential for being grown in the US among all biomass alternatives.  
Perlack et al. (2005) reported that 55 million acres of cropland, idle cropland, and cropland 
pasture could be seeded to produce switchgrass.  English et al. (2006) also concluded that 
switchgrass could be planted on more than 100 million US acres with some incentives.  The 
production costs of growing switchgrass in specific regions in the US are lower than those of 
other herbaceous crops (Khanna et al. 2008).  Compared to traditional food crops such as corn 
and soybeans, switchgrass has many advantages.  It grows on many soil types, including 
marginal lands not economically viable to grow traditional crops (Fewell et al. 2011), and only 
requires moderate inputs.  For example, it is well adapted to grow on a large portion of the US 
land with low fertilizer applications and high resistance to naturally occurring pests and diseases 
(Bransby 1998).  Switchgrass also helps to improve water quality and wildlife habitat (Duffy and 
Nanhou 2001), and protects soil from being eroded.  
However, the market for switchgrass is not well developed yet (Fewell et al. 2011).  Risk 
and uncertainty in switchgrass production and marketing are the major concerns for farmers 
when deciding whether to grow switchgrass.  A contractual relationship with biorefineries 
specifying price, harvest timing, storage, and other requirements in contract clauses is welcome 
by farmers (Fewell et al. 2011).  Meanwhile, a long-term production and harvest contract with an 
individual farmer can also be used by the biorefinery to reduce the switchgrass procurement risk 
(Epplin et al. 2007).  Moreover, the high cost of constructing a production facility encourages the 
biorefinery to use contracts to induce farmers to supply sufficient feedstocks that will keep the 
plant operating at capacity (Larson et al. 2008).   
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Figure 1 gives a basic description of determining the switchgrass contract price between 
the biorefinery and the farmers.  The biorefinery represents the demand side for the switchgrass, 
while the farmers represent the supply side of the switchgrass.  The biorefinery’s profit is mainly 
from producing and selling ethanol
1
.  Therefore, the revenue from ethanol sales is directly related 
to the ethanol market price and total ethanol output level.  On the other hand, the costs of 
producing ethanol center on four main components: switchgrass procurement costs, switchgrass 
transportation cost, switchgrass storage cost, and biorefinery plant operating and maintenance 
cost.  The conversion rate which is the amount (e.g. gallons) of ethanol produced from each ton 
of switchgrass measures the production efficiency in ethanol production. 
The farmers can select whether to use their land to produce switchgrass or use the land as 
perhaps pasture for beef cattle or a traditional food crop, such as corn.  If they decide to sign a 
contract and produce switchgrass, their profit will be determined by the switchgrass contract 
price, switchgrass yield, and the production costs.  To attract farmers to grow switchgrass, the 
biorefinery must pay farmers enough to cover the explicit switchgrass production cost such as 
seed cost and fertilizer cost, and be high enough to cover the farmer’s opportunity cost of 
producing switchgrass, or the expected profit from alternative land use.  However, the 
biorefinery, a profit-maximizer itself, will try to keep the purchasing price, which is an input cost 
to the biorefinery, as low as possible.   
 
                                                 
1
 Under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) each biorefinery has a quota for ethanol use.  Biorefineries unable to 
meet their quota can purchase RINs (renewable identification numbers) from others who exceed their quota.  A RIN 
is a 38-character code attached to a gallon of ethanol. Therefore, the biorefinery may also obtain profit from trading 
the RINs.  The profit from trading RINs is not considered in this study. 
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Figure 1    Switchgrass Supply/Demand Contract 
 
 
Research Objectives 
Using west Tennessee as a case study, the research objectives are: 
1. Determine the contract price paid to the farmer under a Capacity Procurement Contract 
(CPC)
2
 where the biorefinery pays a price for each acre of land allocated to switchgrass 
production. 
2. Determine the contract price paid to the farmer under a Tonnage Contract (TC) where the 
biorefinery pays a price for each ton of switchgrass harvested.   
                                                 
2
 Capacity Procurement Contract is often referred to as Acreage Contract. 
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3. Determine the impact of land type on the contract price for both contract options. 
4. Analyze the biorefinery’s profit under each contract and different land types. 
5. Conduct a sensitivity analysis on pre contract prices and on profits post contract. 
6. Analyze contracts to determine the type contract that would be preferred by the biorefinery. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The literature review reflects the major components of Figure 1:  ethanol production, 
switchgrass production, and contracts.   
  
2.1 Ethanol Production 
 
2.1.1 Ethanol Production Process 
Switchgrass is classified as a lignocellulosic crop because it is primarily the cell walls 
that are digested to form sugars which can subsequently be fermented to produce liquid fuels 
(Wyman 1993; McLaughlin et al. 1999).  Three major components of switchgrass are:  cellulose 
(30-50%), hemicellulose (15-35%), and lignin (10-30%) (Carolan et al. 2007).  Cellulose is a 
polymer of glucose, and hemicellulose is a polymer of five and six carbon sugars, mostly xylose.  
Both cellulose and hemicellulose can be converted to produce ethanol.  Lignin cannot contribute 
to ethanol production.  The high content of cellulose and hemicellulose (70%-90% in total) 
makes switchgrass the most promising feedstock for producing ethanol. 
A thermo-chemical process and a biochemical process are the two ways used to convert 
biomass into biofuels.  The thermo-chemical process is mainly used for the production of 
Fischer-Tropsch diesel fuel and hydrogen; biochemical processing, in contrast, is considered to 
be the most suitable method for converting biomass into ethanol (Carolan et al. 2007).  In 
biochemical processing, pretreatment of switchgrass is needed to increase the surface area and 
make it more accessible to enzyme hydrolysis.  Pretreated biomass then undergoes a hydrolysis 
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process to depolymerize the cellulose and hemicellulose into sugars.  Next, enzymes are used to 
convert the sugars into ethanol through fermentation (Sun and Cheng 2002).  Finally, the ethanol 
product is obtained through a recovery process (Carolan et al. 2007).  
 
2.1.2 Conversion Rate  
Conversion rate is usually used to determine the efficiency of producing ethanol using 
switchgrass as the feedstock.  A higher conversion rate means that the biorefinery can produce 
more ethanol with a fixed amount of switchgrass or it needs less switchgrass to produce a certain 
amount of ethanol.  Conversion rate is restricted by the technology employed by the biorefinery.  
For example, the conversion rate will be different between a thermo-chemical and a biochemical 
process.  Various conversion rates are assumed in current literature.  Three conversion rates, 60, 
80, and 100 gallons of ethanol per ton of switchgrass, are assumed in Haque and Epplin (2012) 
with regard to a small, medium and large plant size biorefinery accordingly.  The conversion rate 
was assumed to be 82.69 gallons per ton in Schmer et al. (2008).  Humbird et al. (2011) reported 
the conversion rate to be 79.09 gallons per ton which is close to the conversion rate of a medium 
sized biorefinery (80.05 gallons per ton) used in Haque and Epplin (2012).  Sendich et al (2008) 
and Wu et al. (2010) estimated the conversion rate to be 69.99 gallons per ton.  Eggeman and 
Elander (2005) reported the conversion rate to be 64.95 gallons of ethanol out of one ton of 
switchgrass. 
 
2.1.3 Ethanol Production Cost and Breakeven Price 
Because the biomass market has not been well developed yet, the analysis of market price 
for ethanol produced from biomass is limited.  Most research on ethanol price has focused on the 
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estimation of the biorefinery production cost, or ethanol breakeven price.  Plant operation and 
maintenance cost includes labor cost, utilities expenses, chemical cost, taxes, repair cost, and 
investments.  The plant operation and maintenance cost is assumed to be $0.75 per gallon 
(Haque and Epplin 2012).   
The estimated total cost to produce cellulosic ethanol ranges from $0.79 to $4.73 per 
gallon (Haque and Epplin 2012).  The average cost estimations differ due to the assumptions of 
ethanol conversion rate, biorefinery investment cost, switchgrass cost as the feedstock, the 
commercial scale of operation, and whether storage and transportation costs were considered to 
be costs to the biorefinery.   
Wyman (2007) indicated that total production cost per gallon of ethanol varied from 
$0.52 to $0.64, and the $0.12 variability was due entirely to changes in ethanol yield per ton of 
switchgrass.  The US Department of Energy estimated that the cost of producing ethanol would 
be $1.02 per gallon (Aden et al. 2002; Goldemberg 2007; Tyner 2008).  The study by 
Goldemberg (2007) showed the total ethanol production cost was $1.07 per gallon.  Tyner (2008) 
estimated the total cost of ethanol would be $1.12 per gallon.  The highest ethanol breakeven 
price was estimated by Haque and Epplin (2012) ranging from $0.44 to $0.72 per liter ($1.67-
$2.73 per gallon) conditioned on different biorefinery plant sizes and ethanol conversion rate 
assumptions.  The main difference in these estimations depended on whether storage and 
transportation costs were considered to be costs to the biorefinery. 
Based on a sample of 4,825 monthly reports from 232 fueling stations in Minnesota 
between October 1997 and November 2006, the retail ethanol price ranged from $0.74 to $2.96 
per gallon, with mean $1.74 per gallon and standard deviation $0.35 per gallon, while the range 
of the wholesale ethanol price was larger: ranging from $0.45to $3.03 per gallon, with a lower 
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mean $1.27 and higher standard deviation $0.56 in 2006 dollars (Anderson 2010).  Both the 
retail and wholesale average price of ethanol are slightly higher than the estimated breakeven 
prices, indicating there is only a little profit margin for biorefineries.  The biorefinery may be 
faced with a perfectly competitive ethanol market. 
 
2.1.4 Ethanol Futures Pricing 
One of the main difficulties in an empirical study of ethanol price is that the spot market 
price is quite uncertain.  The daily or weekly spot price is not only hard to observe directly, but 
also varies among different geographic regions, which makes the spot price report of ethanol 
unreliable.  In contrast, the futures contracts are better organized and standardized, and traded 
actively in the exchanges.  Therefore, the futures prices of ethanol provide the guidelines for the 
ethanol price evaluation.  In fact, the corresponding prices of ethanol futures contracts closest to 
maturity are often used as a proxy for the spot price (Schwartz 1997).  Brennan and Schwartz 
(1985) derived a mathematical relationship between the futures prices and spot prices using a 
stochastic model to describe the movement of commodity spot prices.  Moreover, Gibson and 
Schwartz (1990) built a similar model considering both the spot price movement and the benefits 
from holding a futures contract, or instantaneous convenient yield, to derive the functional 
relationship between the futures price and the spot price.  These futures pricing formulas 
provided the theoretical basis for applying empirical analysis to estimate and to project 
commodity spot prices.  Applying the Kalman filter method, Schwartz (1997) found that simply 
modeling the commodity spot price movement without considering the instantaneous 
convenience yield could not describe the commodity futures price movement very well.  
Moreover, Schwartz and Smith (2000) described a model by splitting the spot price into two 
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components: a short-term price deviation component and a long-term equilibrium price 
component.  The Kalman filter was also used in Schwartz and Smith (2000) to estimate and to 
forecast the unobservable commodity spot prices.  The detailed futures pricing techniques can be 
found in Schreve (2004) and Duffie (2001).  A summary of the Kalman filter method is 
demonstrated in Appendix A.3
3
.   
 
 
2.2 Switchgrass Production 
 
2.2.1 Switchgrass Yield 
 The planting dates of switchgrass range from late-April to mid-June.  In the first year, 
about 25% of switchgrass will not survive the winter of that year.  In the second year, the 
switchgrass that failed to survive will be replaced or reseeded (Khanna et al. 2008).  As a 
perennial crop, switchgrass can be harvested annually.  About 67% of the maximum yield of 
switchgrass will be harvested in the second year (Khanna et al. 2008).  From the third year 
onwards, the yields remain constant through the remaining life of the crop.  Mooney et al. (2009) 
also reported the first and second-year switchgrass yields would be 14% and 60% of third-year 
yields on average.  Moreover, switchgrass can be harvested as a one- or two-cut system (Garland 
2008).  There would be an 8% increase in the yield with two-cut management for switchgrass 
(Alamo) compared to the one-cut management (Fike et al. 2007).  When cut twice a year, the 
first cutting would occur when switchgrass is in late boot to very early seedhead emergence in 
                                                 
3
 More formal and complete discussions on Kalman filter were demonstrated in Harvey (1989) (Chapter 3), 
Hamilton (1994) (Chapter 13), Brockwell and Davis (2002) (Chapter 8), Durbin and Koopman (2012) (Chapter 2 
and 4), and West and Harrison (1997). 
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late-June or early-July; the second cutting would be in November or the first killing frost, 
whichever comes earlier (Garland 2008).   
The yield of switchgrass production also varies among different production 
environments.  The southeastern United States is considered a likely region to produce 
switchgrass because growing seasons are longer and the yield for traditional crops is lower 
compared to other regions (Boyer et al. 2012; Dicks et al. 2009; English et al. 2006; Mooney et 
al. 2009).  Estimated across the lifespan of switchgrass, the yield per acre in the southern US is 
considered to be greater than that in the northern states (McLaughlin and Kszos 2005).  Walsh et 
al. (2003) estimated that on the land currently planting traditional crops, the average yield of 
switchgrass in the southeast US was 5.49 tons per acre with a range from 3.40 to 6.47 tons per 
acre; however, the average yield was 3.48 tons per acre in the northern Plains ranging from 2.01 
to 5.49 tons per acre.  Duffy (2007) calculated the average yield level of switchgrass was 4 tons 
per acre in Iowa.  Khanna et al. (2008) estimated the yield of switchgrass in Illinois was 4.20 
tons per acre.  In contrast, the switchgrass estimations in southern states were higher.  Fike et al. 
(2006) reported an average yield of 5.45 tons per acre in West Tennessee.  McLaughlin and 
Kszos (2005) reported the average yield in Tennessee was 6.16 tons per acre with the best one-
year yield at 12.22 tons per acre.  Muir et al. (2001) reported an average yield of 5.97 tons per 
acre in Texas.  Epplin et al. (2007) reported that the average annual yield of switchgrass in 
Oklahoma was 6.06 tons per acre.   
 Mooney et al. (2009) reported that the yield of switchgrass was affected by the land 
quality.  Based on a 3-year multilocation experiment at Milan, TN, they estimated the well-
drained upland location suitable for row crops had the highest yield of 7.89 tons per acre and the 
poorly drained flood plain location had the lowest yield of 3.79 tons per acre.  Similar to Mooney 
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et al. (2009), research in west Tennessee during a seven-year period (2005-2011) was conducted 
by Boyer et al. (2012) on four landscapes: (i) a well-drained level upland (WDLU), (ii) a well- to 
moderately well-drained floodplain (WDFP), (iii) a moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded 
sloping upland (MDSU), (iv) a poorly drained floodplain (PDFP).  The WDLU and WDFP 
landscapes were well suited for row crop production in Tennessee, while the MDSU and PDFP 
landscapes represented the marginal land for crop production in Tennessee (Boyer et al. 2012).  
During this longer time period compared to Mooney et al (2009), the average yields of 
switchgrass calculated by Boyer et al. (2012) across these seven years from these four types of 
landscapes (WDLU, WDFP, MDSU, and PDFP) were 7.19, 7.57, 7.86, and 7.17 tons per acre 
respectively.   
 
2.2.2 Switchgrass Production Costs and Breakeven Price 
Much of the analysis of the economic potential for switchgrass has focused on estimating 
switchgrass production costs (Jensen et al. 2007).  Mooney et al. (2009) analyzed the production 
costs based on the University of Tennessee Extension switchgrass production budget including 
the costs involved in establishment, maintenance and harvest stages.  Maintenance cost included 
capital recovery cost, machinery repair and maintenance cost, fuel and lube cost, taxes, insurance 
expenses and housing cost, assuming the use of 150-hp tractors to power farm implements, labor 
at $8.50 per hour, a diesel fuel price of $2.12 per gallon, and a nominal interest rate of 8%.  
Establishment cost was limited to the first year of production and included machinery and labor 
time, seed, herbicide, fertilizer, and interest on operating costs.  Seed price was $20 per pound of 
pure live seed, while 98.8 pounds of 52OP  and 197.8 pounds of OK2  were used as nutrients per 
acre at a price of $0.32 and $0.22 per pound accordingly (Garland 2008).  Harvest cost was 
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calculated as a function of yield for switchgrass harvested in large round bales (1500 pounds per 
bale) and included machinery and labor costs, bale twine cost and interest on variable operating 
cost.  The total harvest cost varied depending on the yield of the switchgrass.  Moreover, total 
switchgrass production cost in the first year differed from costs in subsequent years, because the 
cost of land preparation and planting to establish the crop occurred in the first year.  In the 
second year, reseeding or replanting costs would occur from replacing plants that did not survive 
the first winter (Khanna et al. 2008).  In the subsequent years, the maintenance cost and harvest 
cost were assumed to be constant through the remaining lifespan of switchgrass.  
Breakeven price is commonly analyzed in evaluating the economic potential of 
switchgrass.  The farm-gate breakeven price is the price per ton of switchgrass needed to offset 
all costs of production incurred over the lifetime of the crop discounted to current prices divided 
by the discounted value of successive yields (Khanna et al. 2008).  Farm-gate price does not 
consider any other costs beyond harvest and storage of switchgrass bales at field edge.  Due to 
the different weather and land conditions and different assumptions made on bale types and 
storage methods, the average cost of producing switchgrass varies among different regions, and 
therefore the breakeven price differs accordingly.  Generally speaking, the production of 
switchgrass in the Southeastern US has an advantage compared to the northern US latitudes.  
Duffy (2007) calculated the breakeven price for switchgrass to be $82.23 per ton in Iowa by 
assuming the rectangular bales and indoor storage.  Khanna et al. (2008) estimated a farm-gate 
breakeven price for switchgrass to be $88.90 per ton in Illinois.  Perrin et al (2008) estimated the 
average of farm-gate breakeven prices in central Plains at $53.52 per ton.  In contrast, the 
breakeven price for switchgrass ranged from $42.90 to $62.23 per ton in the southeastern US 
depending on the land conditions (Mooney et al. 2009).  Epplin et al. (2007) reported a unit 
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production cost of switchgrass for the southern states to be $50.80 per ton without considering 
the costs beyond harvest.   Based on the net present value (NPV) approach, Walsh et al. (2003) 
used the POLYSYS
4
 model to estimate the farm-gate price of bioenergy crops based on the 
competition with alternative usage of croplands.  Through the modeling of the switchgrass 
supply schedule and the demand schedule, the farm-gate price of switchgrass was estimated to be 
$49.91 per dry ton. 
Contrary to the popular belief, few farmland acres are not used in productive activities.  
Therefore, switchgrass production will require some shift in traditional cropland use to “biofuel 
feedstocks” (Dicks et al. 2009).  The competition of bioenergy crops with high-value crops in 
land usage determines the opportunity cost of alternative land uses (Walsh et al. 2003; Mooney 
et al. 2009), that is, the profits foregone from the most profitable alternative use of the land that 
is converted to a perennial grass (Khanna et al. 2008).  A survey conducted by Jensen et al. 
(2007) revealed that farmers with higher net farm incomes per acre were willing to convert 
smaller shares of their farmland to switchgrass.  Those with higher off-farm incomes were 
willing to convert more acres.  The research done in Illinois assumed that corn and soybean were 
the two dominant row crops grown in rotation with each other as the alternative for switchgrass 
(Khanna et al. 2008).  The breakeven price of switchgrass was calculated to be $90 per dry ton 
after including the opportunity cost of land compared to $65 per ton without including the 
opportunity cost of land (Khanna et al. 2008).   
 
                                                 
4
 POLYSYS is an agricultural policy simulation model of the U.S. agricultural sector. It includes national demand, 
regional supply, livestock and aggregate income modules. POLYSYS model is used to simulate impacts to the U.S. 
agricultural sector resulting from changes in policy, economics, or resource conditions (Walsh et al. 2003).  
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2.2.3 Switchgrass Transportation and Storage 
 After being harvested, the feedstocks, e.g. switchgrass, need to be transported to the 
biorefinery and stored.  Whether the storage and transportation cost should be shouldered by the 
biorefinery or by the farmers depends on the specification of their contracts.  But due to the 
equipment-intensive enterprise nature of transportation and storage, it is usually assumed to be 
the biorefinery which shoulders the transportation and storage tasks (Cundiff and Marsh 1996).  
The transportation cost includes loading cost, labor cost, fuel cost, and machinery cost.  The cost 
of hauling switchgrass can be minimized through maximizing the dry matter in every truckload 
(Cundiff and Grisso 2008).  Larson et al. (2005) indicated that the cost of transportation was $10 
per dry ton.  Perrin et al. (2008) reported that the average cost of transporting round bales to a 
refinery was about $13 per ton.  Other research maintained that the average transportation cost 
was affected by the distance shipped from the farm to the biorefinery.  Walsh et al. (1998) 
estimated the transportation cost ranged from $5 per dry ton to $8 per dry ton within a 25 mile 
transport distance.  Duffy and Nanhou (2001) claimed that the estimated transportation costs 
were about $0.10 per dry ton per mile for hauling distances of less than 50 miles and the typical 
transportation costs were expected to be between $5 and $10 per dry ton for a distance less than 
75 miles.  Duffy (2007) estimated that the transportation cost was $6.10 per ton within a 5-mile 
trip, and the transportation cost increased to $8.65 per ton within a 30-mile trip. 
The exposure of switchgrass bales to rain, ultraviolet rays and humidity result in the dry 
matter loss of switchgrass during the storage process (Sanderson et al. 1997).  The cost of storing 
includes not only the cost for the facilities used, but also the dry matter loss associated with 
various storage methods (Duffy 2007).  The storage cost also varies with regard to bale types.  
Rectangular bales have the cost advantage in transportation and saving space in storage 
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compared to round bales, but the dry matter loss is greater using square bales than using covered 
round bales (English et al. 2008).  Large round bales have the advantage of shedding water 
which is especially needed in the southern U.S. due to the year-round precipitation (Larson et al. 
2005).  Cundiff and Marsh (1996) estimated the cost for storing round switchgrass bales without 
a tarp was $3.20 per dry ton.  Wang et al. (2009) determined that the cost of storage for a round 
bale was $3.83 per dry ton.  The difference was whether the round bales were wrapped with 
plastic tarp or not.  Duffy (2007) estimated that the storage cost per ton for square bales (348 
feet, with a weight of 950 pounds) was $16.67 if stored in an enclosed building. 
 
 
2.3 Contracts 
 
An extensive literature examines the reason why an agricultural producer might prefer a 
marketing or production contract to a spot market.  Asset specificity, which is the degree of an 
asset can be used to other purposes, and uncertainty are the key motivators for contract 
application (Jensen et al. 2007).  The ownership of a highly specialized asset can leave a party 
vulnerable in negotiations which may cause the owner prefer a contract to reduce the risks 
involved (Jensen et al. 2011).  Moreover, a greater uncertainty in price implies a greater risk 
from opportunistic behavior.  Thus, a contract will limit the exposure to environmental (e.g. 
supply, demand, and price) uncertainty (Franken et al. 2009). 
Contracts are widely used in traditional agricultural sectors to reduce the risk and 
uncertainty in production and marketing.  With the level of vertical integration in agricultural 
markets growing over the last decade, production contracts have been more prevalent in 
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livestock and specialty grains markets because of the risk in production and procurement in spot 
markets (Goodhue 2000; Ginder et al. 2000).  Principal-agent
5
 theory was used in Goodhue 
(2000) to model production contracts in the broiler industry.  The study found that contracts 
outlining different compensation schemes were optimal responses to risk aversion.  A transaction 
cost approach, used to examine specialty crop contracts in Canada, found that market power on 
the buyers’ side led to reduced competition in the contract’s compensation terms (Weleschuk and 
Kerr 1995).  The standard marketing contract (or bushel contract) and the acreage contract in 
specialty grain production were also analyzed in Paulson and Babcock (2007).  By modeling the 
production uncertainty in switchgrass and corn, the result indicated that bushel contract structure 
Pareto dominated the optimal acreage contract (Paulson and Babcock 2007).   
Various studies have found farm characteristics and farmer demographics have an impact 
on farmers’ choice on whether or not to use a contract.  For example, a larger farm size has a 
positive impact on contracting (Jensen et al. 2011; Dong et al. 2008; Edleman 2006).  The 
diversification of the farm is negatively related with contracting (Davis and Gillespie 2007; 
Dong et al. 2008) due to the reason that diversification can reduce the risk.  Jensen et al. (2011) 
gave the detailed description in current literature with regard to the farm characteristic and 
farmer demographic impacts on the selection of contracting. 
Because the market for switchgrass has not been well-developed, the risks of producing 
and procuring switchgrass also play a major role for farmers and the biorefinery respectively.  
Given the high cost of constructing a production facility, the biorefinery will have an incentive to 
provide the farmers a contract to guarantee a sufficient feedstock to keep the plant operating at 
capacity (Larson et al. 2008).  Jensen et al. (2011) suggested that the farmers are willing to grow 
                                                 
5
 The principal–agent problem concerns the difficulties in motivating one party (the ‘agent’) to act on behalf of 
another (the ‘principal’) due to information imperfection.   
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switchgrass under a contract.  This willingness was greater among the farmers who farmed more 
lands, had facilities in which they could store switchgrass and had substantial off-farm income.  
The contract can also reduce the risk and uncertainty faced by the farmers in switchgrass 
marketing.  Yang et al. (2012) revealed that for a given level of risk aversion, farmers with low 
land quality were more willing to sign contracts with a biorefinery to produce bioenergy crops 
due to the cost of foregoing row crop production.  The higher the risk level of the farmers, the 
more likely they will contract with biorefineries (Yang et al. 2012).  Therefore, a contractual 
arrangement is beneficial to both farmers and the biorefinery.  A guaranteed price at which the 
switchgrass is sold to the biorefinery needs to be specified in the contract (Covert and English 
2012).  From the biorefinery’s perspective, the guaranteed price facilitates the biorefinery 
making future predictions and calculations regarding the price of ethanol produced.  From a 
farmer’s perspective, a contract minimizes the risk and uncertainty in switchgrass production and 
marketing, especially when the switchgrass market is under development.  Yang et al. (2012) 
also suggested that farmers’ land allocation decisions are dependent on both their individual land 
quality and risk preferences.  A farmer with low land quality and high degree of risk aversion 
will choose to lease their land for biomass production.  A farmer with low land quality and low 
risk aversion will choose to grow the energy crop under a profit sharing contract instead of a 
fixed price contract.  
A contract also needs to specify the lifespan of the contract for farmers and the 
biorefinery.  A ten-year production lifespan is usually used in literature (Duffy 2007; Khanna et 
al. 2008).  Perrin et al. (2008) maintained that the average cost of switchgrass production over 
ten years ($53.61 per ton) was lower than the average cost over five years ($59.75 per ton) based 
on their experience in North Dakota, South Dakota and Nebraska.  Mooney et al. (2009) reported 
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the yield and breakeven prices of switchgrass for both a 5-year and 10-year contract lifespan and 
concluded that the breakeven price for a 5-year contract is higher than for a 10-year contract.  
The contract beyond five years may be subject to more production risk and uncertainty in future 
price fluctuations and does not take full consideration of the possibility of switchgrass seed 
improvement. 
A detailed study on biomass contract structures with regard to the potential of a West 
Tennessee grain farm to supply lignocellulosic biomass to a biorefinery was conducted by 
Larson et al. (2008).  Four potential types of contracts offering different levels of biomass price, 
yield, and production risk-sharing between farmers and biorefineries were analyzed: the spot 
market contract, the standard marketing contract, the acreage contract, and the gross revenue 
contract (Larson et al.  2008).  Their research evaluated the ability and willingness of farmers to 
provide lignocellulosic biomass feedstocks under risk given the farmers’ on-farm situation and 
potential contractual arrangements with user facilities (Larson et al. 2008).  In a spot market 
contract, biomass was priced yearly on its current energy equivalent value as a substitute for 
gasoline.  Farmers bore all the output price, yield, and production risk from biomass production 
in this contract.  In a standard marketing contract, biomass was sold at the equivalent spot market 
price with a penalty for underage or excess production.  Larson et al. (2005) analyzed the risk 
management benefits of a standard marketing contract.  It was shown in Larson et al (2008) that 
a portion of risk was shifted from farmers to the biorefinery.  An acreage contract guaranteed a 
fixed annual price for the actual biomass produced on the contracted acreages, and the 
biorefinery had to buy all the yield of the switchgrass annually.  All price risks were born by the 
biorefinery while farmers still incurred all yield and production cost risks.  In contrast, 
guaranteed annual gross revenue per acre over the life of the contract was provided in a gross 
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revenue contract (Larson et al. 2008).  Larson et al. (2008) pointed out that the acreage and gross 
revenue contracts were more effective at inducing maximum farm biomass production at lower 
contract prices than the standard contract for a risk neutral decision maker.   
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CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1    The Biorefinery 
 
3.1.1    Ethanol Production  
The production function of ethanol is subject to the technology a biorefinery owns to 
produce ethanol using switchgrass as a feedstock.  More specifically, assume the conversion rate 
from switchgrass to ethanol is  , which means the biorefinery will produce   units (e.g. 
gallons) of ethanol using one unit (e.g. ton) of switchgrass as feedstock; then the production 
function of the biorefinery is a linear function to the amount of switchgrass used as input, that is, 
(1)                                                              )(LQY t   
where Y is the quantity of ethanol produced, and )(LQt  the amount of switchgrass produced with 
  units (e.g. acres) of land used as the feedstock in year t.  The marginal production in equation 
(1) is constant which is different from the usual assumption of diminishing marginal returns.  
However, the conversion rate   in equation (1) can be explained as the average conversion rate 
when the biorefinery uses switchgrass to produce ethanol.  It represents the average production 
efficiency in a biorefinery’s production process.  
 
3.1.2    Biorefinery’s Profit 
Considering the heterogeneity among farmers, e.g. farmers locate in different counties or 
have different land fertility levels (Jensen et al. 2007), the biorefinery can try to sign a contract 
with each farmer willing to grow switchgrass.  In each contract, switchgrass price is specified 
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clearly with other contract clauses.  Through a price discrimination strategy, the biorefinery can 
take advantage of the heterogeneity among farmers, and achieve the greatest profit level.   
All costs apart from the costs of purchasing, storing and transporting switchgrass, such as 
labor cost, biorefinery maintenance cost, and monitoring cost, are assumed to be at a fixed level 
held by the biorefinery.  The biorefinery has the capacity to process all the switchgrass.  Assume 
the total expenditure on switchgrass procurement is SW.  Dry matter loss is not considered; the 
amount of switchgrass stored and delivered should be equal to the amount of switchgrass 
harvested.  The total cost of producing ethanol from switchgrass is the summation of switchgrass 
procurement cost SW, storage cost, transportation cost, and the operating and maintenance cost.  
When the ethanol spot market is perfectly competitive, or the biorefinery is a price-taker in 
ethanol market, the revenue of selling ethanol in spot market equals the ethanol spot price S(t) 
multiplied by ethanol output level Y, which is S(t)Y.  So the biorefinery’s profit at time t can be 
determined by subtracting total costs of ethanol production from the total revenue of ethanol 
sales, that is, 
(2)                               )()()( LQmLQsYOMCSWYtS ttt   
where OMC is the average plant operating and maintenance cost, s is the storage cost per ton of 
switchgrass stored/harvested and m is the transportation cost per ton of switchgrass 
transported/harvested.  By substituting equation (1) into equation (2), the profit equation can be 
rewritten as: 
(3)                               )()()()( LQmLQsSWLQOMCtS tttt      
The biorefinery should determine the contract price based on the maximization of the 
expected value of the future’s discounted profit within the full contract lifespan.  The reason that 
the expected value needs to be considered by the biorefinery is that though the biorefinery’s 
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production condition may not have significant changes during the contract lifespan (therefore the 
costs may stay constant), the ethanol spot price will not be the same as the price when the 
contract is signed.  Therefore the biorefinery’s profit in the future is subject to the future ethanol 
spot market conditions, which makes it necessary to project the future profit level when it tries to 
enter a contract specifying the input procurement in the future.  Assuming the contract lasts T 
years and the switchgrass is harvested once a year, by continuously discounting all the future net 
cash inflow/profit back into the initial time 0t , the continuous-time present value is: 
(4)                            dteSWLQmsOMCtSEdteE rt
T
t
rt
T
t

  00 )()(      
where r is the discount factor.  Equation (4) gives the overall discounted profit level the 
biorefinery can achieve during a contract lifespan of T by signing a switchgrass procurement 
contract with a farmer.  
 
 
3.1.3    Ethanol Price 
3.1.3.1    Ethanol Valuation Model 
Often, the daily or weekly spot prices of ethanol are hard to obtain, especially when one 
tries to collect the historical data.  The spot market price also varies among different counties and 
states which makes it very uncertain.  The same commodity’s futures contract price is often 
chosen to be the proxy for the spot price.  A standard model built in Schwartz (1997) described 
the functional relationship between the futures price and the spot price of different commodities.  
The model in Schwartz (1997) and its empirical application can be found in Appendix A.1. 
Compared to the model described in Schwartz (1997), Schwartz and Smith (2000) 
developed a simpler and more intuitive model by splitting the spot price into two components: 
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the long-run equilibrium price component and the short-run price deviation component.  The 
long-run equilibrium price components describe the “fair value” of the commodity based on the 
current demand and supply conditions.  However, the spot price is usually not equal to the 
equilibrium price.  There is a difference between the spot price and the equilibrium price in most 
cases, which is the short-run price deviation component.  Moreover, it has been shown that the 
model in Schwartz and Smith (2000) is equivalent to the model described in Schwartz (1997), 
but the parameters to be estimated are fewer in Schwartz and Smith (2000) model.  In this thesis, 
the Schwartz and Smith (2000) model is used to describe the price movement of ethanol due to 
its parsimonious property in parameter estimation. 
In this model, the Efficient Market Hypothesis is adopted, which means that the futures 
market efficiently incorporates all public information.  All the information obtained by the 
public, including individual investors and researchers, has already been incorporated in the 
futures price.  For example, if an oil shortage has been expected by the public, the futures price 
of ethanol will increase based on the expectation of high ethanol demand in the future. 
Let tS  denote the spot price of ethanol at time t.  Assume that the spot price of ethanol 
can be decomposed into two components: the long-run equilibrium price component t  and the 
short-term deviation component t , which is, 
(5)                                                     tttS  )log(  
Moreover, the short-term deviation is assumed to follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
6
 
with mean reverting towards zero, which can be shown in a total derivative function: 
(6)                                                      11dzdtd tt    
and the equilibrium price level is assumed to follow a Brownian motion process 
                                                 
6
 In an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process,  , satisfies the following stochastic differential equation:     (   )   
   , where    denotes the Wiener process (or Brownian motion).   
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(7)                                                       22dzdtd t    
where 1dz  and 2dz  are the increments of a standard Brownian motion process
7
.  Assume that the 
short-term deviation and equilibrium price are correlated with 
(8)                                                         dtdzdz 21  
Equation (6) shows a negative relationship between the change in deviation and the deviation 
level.  It means that when the short-term deviation is increasing, the speed of the deviation 
change will decrease until the deviation disappears.  This inverse relationship is the “mean-
reverting” property.  In other words, the mean-reverting property in equation (6) shows that there 
is an inner force that will pull the spot price towards the equilibrium price level, though they 
seldom will be the same.  The increment 1dz describes the unexpected change in the price 
deviation which is subject to some unforeseeable random events.  Sometimes some events will 
push the spot price away from the equilibrium level while some events will pull the spot price 
closer to the equilibrium level.  Parameter   in equation (6) describes the rate at which the short-
term deviations are expected to disappear.  Different from equation (6), equation (7) assumes that 
there is a trend in the equilibrium price movement with a rate   though the equilibrium price is 
still subject to the random change 2dz .  Variables 1  and 2  describe the volatility of the 
random effects in both the short-run deviation and long-run equilibrium respectively, and the 
random effects are correlated with a coefficient  .  
Under the assumptions mentioned in equations (5), (6), (7), and (8), it can be shown that 
t and t  are jointly normally distributed with the mean vector (Appendix A.2): 
                                                 
7
 Let (     ) be a probability space. For each    , Brownian motion is a continuous function  ( ) depending on 
  that satisfies: (1)  ( )   ; (2) for all               , the increments  (  )   (  )  (  )  
 (  )    (  )   (    ) are independent, and (3) each of these increments is normally distributed with 
 ( (    )   (  ))       ( (    )   (  ))          (Shreve 2004). 
26 
 
(9)                                                   teE ttt   00  
which means that the expected value of the short-run price deviation component, t , is 0
te and 
the expected value of long-run equilibrium price component, t , is t 0 .  Parameters 0  and 
0  stand for the current short-run price deviation component level and long-run equilibrium price 
component level.  As can be seen from equation (9), the expectation of short-run price deviation 
follows an exponential path with respect to time, which is faster than the change in the 
expectation of long-run equilibrium price which follows a linear path along with time.  
Moreover, the variance-covariance matrix of t and t  can be written as 
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which means that the variances of the short-run price deviation component, t , and the long-run 
equilibrium price component, t , are 


2
)1(
2
12 te  and t
2
2 .  Therefore, the variance of long-run 
equilibrium price increases with time which shows that the forecasted price will be less accurate 
in the future.  The covariance of short-run price deviation component and the long-run 
equilibrium price component is 

 21)1( te . 
Given the current level of short-run price deviation and long-run equilibrium price 
components, though they are hypothetical values, 0  and 0  , the log of the ethanol spot price is 
then normally distributed with the mean and variance: 
(11)                                        teSE tt 
   00)log(  
and  
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Equations (11) and (12) can be derived directly from equation (5) in which )log( tS  is defined to 
be the summation of short-run price deviation component t  and long-run equilibrium price 
component t .  The ethanol spot price is therefore log-normally distributed with the expected 
price given by 
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If the forecast horizon increases ( t ) and   is positive, the log of the expected spot price 
can be simplified as 
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which means that the expected future ethanol spot price follows an exponential time path. 
 Under the risk-neutral valuation paradigm, the risk-neutral stochastic process is needed to 
describe the dynamics of the spot ethanol prices, and discounts all cash flows at a risk-free rate 
(Schwartz and Smith 2000).  By introducing two market price of risks, 1  and 2 , for short-run 
price deviation component and long-run equilibrium price component accordingly to specify the 
reductions in the drifts for each process, under an equivalent martingale measure
8
, the risk-
neutral stochastic processes can be rewritten as 
                                                 
8
 Equivalent martingale measure assumption rules out the possibility of arbitrage.  The detailed description on 
equivalent martingale measure can be found in Shreve (2004) (Chapter 5), Duffie (2001) (Chapter 6), Elliott and 
Kopp (2005) (Chapter 2). 
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(16)                                            *111)( dzdtd tt    
(17)                                            *222
* )( dzdtd t    
where 
*
1dz  and 
*
2dz  are increments of standard Brownian motion processes with  
(18)                                                       dtdzdz *2
*
1  
1  and 2  reduce the adjustment speed for both the short-run price deviation component and the 
long-run equilibrium price component.  Different from equation (6), under risk-neutral situation, 
the short-term deviation tends to revert back to 1  instead of zero and the drift of equilibrium 
price is *  (defined to be 2  ) instead of  .  Using similar reasoning for equations (9)-(15), 
under this risk-neutral process, the expected value and variance of the log of spot price, )log( tS , 
are 
(19)                                  teeSE ttt
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Equations (19) and (20) provide the basic information needed to derive the futures pricing 
formula. 
Let TF  denote the current ethanol futures market price with time T from now until 
maturity.  Under the risk neutral assumption, the futures contract price is equal to the forward 
contract price assuming the interest rate is fixed, which means the futures contract price equals to 
the expected spot price, that is, 
(21)              )())(log(var
2
1
))(log())(log()log( 00
*** TAeSSESEF ttttT 
   
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Equation (21) represents the functional relationship between the futures contract price and the 
current short-run price deviation component level and the long-run equilibrium price component 
level.  The time to maturity also affects the price of the futures contract through A(T).  All the 
other unknowns are parameters which can be calculated through empirical estimation. 
 
3.1.3.2    Empirical Model 
The price of ethanol futures contracts can be obtained by transforming the valuation 
model into an empirical model.  However, the ethanol spot price is hard to determine, because it 
differs between different geographic locations across the country.  Moreover, it is also hard to 
detect the short-run price deviation component and the long-run equilibrium price component 
that make up the spot prices as in equation (5).  Therefore, they can only be treated as 
unobservable variables.  Then, equation (21) cannot be estimated directly using time series 
methods.  Instead, the spot price of ethanol and the forecasted price movement of ethanol in the 
future can be estimated and projected using ethanol futures price data through the Kalman filter 
method.   
Kalman filter is an algorithm for sequentially updating a linear projection for the system 
each time a new observation is brought in (Hamilton 1994).  Once the recursive relationships 
between the observable variable and the prediction of unobservable variables are built, the 
unknown parameters can be estimated using Maximum-Likelihood Estimation with the data 
obtained.  The basics on the Kalman filter method are demonstrated in Appendix A.3. 
 If we consider contracts with different days to maturity, nTTT ,,, 21  , equation (21) can 
be rewritten as a discrete form: 
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  )log(...)log(
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t  denotes the measurement error and follows a serially uncorrelated normal distribution with 
the expected value and variance to be 
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Once the data on the futures prices are obtained, the futures prices 
nTTT
FFF ,,,
21
  are obtained.  
The time left to maturity nTTT ,,, 21   can also be obtained.  Therefore, the short-run price 
deviation component t  and long-run equilibrium price component t  are the only unknown 
variables in equation (22).  Without knowing the value of t  and t , the parameters in equation 
(22) are impossible to be estimated.  To estimate the parameters, more assumptions on t  and t  
need to be imposed.  From equations (6) and (7), the state equation can be written in discrete 
time steps as 
(23)                                              ttttt cT  



 11       
where  
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and where t  represents the minimum time unit used in measuring time left to maturity.  
Moreover, t  is the random error and follows a serially uncorrelated normal distribution with 
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t and t  are uncorrelated with all lags, that is, 
0)( ttE  ,   t = 1, 2,…,T and s = 1, 2,…,T 
Combining equations (22) and (23), the parameters  , 1 , 2 ,  , 
* , 1 ,   and H  can 
be estimated.  Intuitively, the long-maturity futures contract price will give information on the 
equilibrium price and the difference between near- and long-term futures prices gives 
information about the short-term deviations (Schwartz and Smith 2000).  Mathematically, from 
equation (5), it can be presented as, 
(24)                                      )exp( 001  TF  and )exp( 0nTF  
Therefore, if the current futures prices are known, the initial (or current) equilibrium price 
component and the price deviation component can be obtained through equation (24). 
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3.2    Farmers 
 
Faced with the contract price of switchgrass proposed by the biorefinery, the farmers 
choose either to accept or to reject the offer.  If the offer is accepted, the farmer signs a  -year 
contract with the biorefinery agreeing to supply switchgrass each year to the biorefinery, and is 
paid annually at the contracted price.  If the offer is rejected, the farmer grows an alternative crop 
instead.  Corn is used as the alternative crop in this analysis.  Therefore, the farmer’s decision is 
based on whether the profit from signing a contract and growing switchgrass is high enough to 
cover the profit earned from growing alternative crops, such as corn.  In other words, the profit 
from growing corn can be viewed as the reservation value considered by the farmer as to whether 
to grow switchgrass or corn. 
 
3.2.1    Switchgrass 
3.2.1.1    Switchgrass Yields 
The annual output level of switchgrass is determined by the inputs and other factors, such 
as weather.  To simplify the analysis, only the land acreage is used as the single input in this 
model.  Therefore, the switchgrass production function can be written as  
                              ~),()( 1 LtfLQsw   
where ),(1 Ltf  is the total output capacity of growing switchgrass on   acres of land in year t, and 
 ̃ is a positive random factor switchgrass output is subject to.  Output capacity function ),(1 Ltf  
is assumed to be independent the random factors.  ~  has the probability density function )(g , 
cumulative density function )(G , support [   ], finite mean 0  and variance 
2
 .  The 
multiplication of switchgrass output capacity and the random factor means that the effect of a 
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yield random factor is to amplify or to narrow the output capacity to some yield level.  For 
example, when the weather is abnormal in some year, e.g. a serious drought hits the region, ~  
will be small, which makes the multiplication of ),(1 Ltf  and 
~  be small.  So the actual 
switchgrass output level is low in that particular year, and the weather condition of that year will 
not affect the switchgrass production in the next year. 
However, by assuming the average yield of switchgrass from one acre of land is    across 
years significantly simplifies the analysis on switchgrass production.  The expected switchgrass 
production from   acres of land can then be written as a linear function of land acreages, that is, 
(25)                                                          LLQE tt 1)(   
where    is the percentage of switchgrass harvested in year t compared to the maximum annual 
yield during the lifespan of switchgrass.  More specifically, Mooney et al. (2009) reported that 
the maximum switchgrass yield occurred from the third year after planting, while the yield in the 
first year is only 14% of the maximum yield , and the yield in the second year is 60% of the 
maximum.  Therefore,     %,100%,100%,60%,14 4321   .  1  represents the 
productivity of switchgrass out of each acre of land, and therefore it varies among different types 
of landscapes.  For example, the yield of switchgrass on fertile land is greater than the less fertile 
land.   
 
3.2.1.2    Switchgrass Production Cost 
Assuming the average switchgrass production cost is    per ton, the total cost of 
producing switchgrass on   acres of land can be written as, 
(26)                                                              )(1 LQcC tsw   
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1c  can also be viewed as the breakeven price of producing switchgrass.  It incorporates all the 
switchgrass production costs, including establishment cost, maintenance cost, harvest cost, etc.  
 
3.2.2    Corn 
3.2.2.1    Corn Production  
Similar to switchgrass production, the production function of corn can also be specified 
as the multiplication of corn potential production )(2 Lf  and a random factor  ̃: 
                              ),()( 2 LtfLQcorn   ̃                                  
 ̃ is the random factor indicating all the factors affecting the production level of corn, e.g. 
weather.  Similar to  ̃,  ̃ has a density function )(h , cumulative density function )(H , support 
[   ], finite mean    and variance   
 .  The corn production capacity function )(2 Lf  is assumed 
to be independent of yield distribution )(H .   
To simplify the corn production function above, the average yield each year from one 
acre of land across years is assumed to be 2 .  Therefore, the expected corn yield each year on L 
acres of land is 
(27)                                                       LLQE corn 2))((   
2  represents the productivity of different types of landscapes.  In this analysis, only two types 
of landscapes, traditional crop production lands and marginal lands are considered.  Expected 
yields on traditional crop production lands will be larger than that from the marginal lands. 
Assuming the average corn production cost is 2c  per ton, the total cost of producing corn 
on L acres of land can be written as, 
(28)                                                            )(2 LQcC corncorn   
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where 2c  incorporates all the corn production costs, such as fertilizer purchasing cost, labor cost, 
and fuel costs. 
 
3.2.2.2    Corn Profit 
The maximum expected corn profit is the opportunity cost to the farmers, when the 
farmers consider signing a contract with the biorefinery to grow switchgrass for a few years.  
During the same lifespan as the switchgrass contract, the expected discounted overall future corn 
profit is: 
(29)                                              dteCLQPE rt
T
corncornt

    0 )(  
where r is the discount factor.   
Farmers will determine the optimal amount of land usage L to obtain the maximum 
expected profit from corn production.  Substituting equation (27) and (28) into equation (29), the 
profit maximization problem faced by the farmers can be written as: 
(30)                                    dtLecPEE rt
T
t
L

  20 20 )(max   
                             LLts     ..  
where L  is the amount of land owned by the farmer.  Therefore, the maximum profit from 
growing corn is: 
(31)                                            dteLcPEE rt
T
t

  20 20 )(   
Because the average yield of corn varies among different landscapes, the profit of growing corn 
will also be different between traditional crop production lands and marginal lands.  If all other 
factors are assumed to be equal, the profit from growing corn on marginal lands will be smaller 
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than that from the traditional crop production lands because the productivity ( 2 ) on marginal 
lands is smaller than that on traditional crop lands.   
 
3.2.2.3    Corn Price 
3.2.2.3.1    Corn Valuation Model 
To simplify the analysis, corn is the only alternative traditional food crop considered by the 
farmers to grow on the land in this model.  The potential profit from corn production determines 
whether the farmers are willing to grow switchgrass.  Farmers need to project the future corn 
price.  However, similar to ethanol spot prices, the corn spot market price is often hard to 
observe directly.  Therefore, the corn futures price is used as the proxy to estimate the corn spot 
prices.  The Schwartz and Smith (2000) model is also used together with Kalman filter to get the 
expected price of corn. 
Assume that the spot price of corn at time t, tP , can be decomposed into two parts: the 
long-run equilibrium price component 

t and the short-run deviation from the equilibrium 
component 

t , that is, 
                                                            



 tttP )log(  
Moreover, the short-run deviation component and long-run equilibrium price component are also 
assumed to follow the following stochastic processes: 
(32)                                                  

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where 

1dz  and 

2dz  are the increments of a standard Brownian motion process.    describes the 
rate at which the short-run deviation is expected to disappear.  Similar to the deductions in 
ethanol pricing, the expected corn price in the future can be derived as a function of spot corn 
price and the expected time length, that is, 
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When the forecast horizon increases (t  ), the log of the expected spot price will be close to  
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 Under risk-neutral assumption, the equations (30) (31) and (32) can be revised by 
introducing martingale measurement and two prices of market risks, that is, 
(36)                                          

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(38)                                                    dtdzdz 
 *
2
*
1  
where 



2
*  , 
*
1dz  and 
*
2dz  are the increments of standard Brownian motion processes 
under martingale measurement, and 

1  and 

2  are the market price of risks for the short-run 
price deviation component and the long-run equilibrium price component.  Let 

TF  denote the 
current corn futures market price with time T from now until maturity.  The futures price can be 
derived as 
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3.2.2.3.2    Empirical Model 
Similar to the ethanol pricing, the parameters are estimated by applying Kalman filter 
method.  Considering the contracts with n different days to maturity nTTT ,,, 21  , equation (39) 
can be rewritten as a discrete form, that is  
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From equations (30) and (31), the state equation written in discrete time steps is 
(41)                                        
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
t and 

t  are uncorrelated with all lags, that is, 
0)( 

ttE  ,   t = 1, 2,…,T and s = 1, 2,…,T 
The long-run equilibrium price component and short-run deviation component at current 
time can be calculated from the following equations based on the near- and long-term futures 
(Schwartz and Smith 2000): 
(42)                                           )exp( 001




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TF  and )exp( 0
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nT
F  
The parameters needed to be calculated are  , 
1 , 

2 ,  , 
* , 
1 ,   and H  .  The projected 
price movement trend can be obtained by substituting the estimated parameters into the 
equations (34) and (35). 
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3.3    Contracts 
 
Some assumptions need to be specified in advance to build the proposed switchgrass 
pricing model.  First, the contract arrangement is assumed to be under a forced compliance 
regime, which means that the biorefinery monitors the action of the farmers to guarantee the full 
employment of the technology and resources owned by farmers (Cachon and Lariviere 2001).  
The biorefinery monitoring activity is so intense that the farmers are forced to do their best to 
produce the switchgrass.  Farmers have no chance to “shirk” under a given contract structure.  
Second, both the biorefinery and the farmers are risk neutral.  Therefore, they are assumed to 
pursue the maximum profit in the contract structure: a monopsonistic biorefinery would try to 
suppress the contract price paid to the farmers; however, the farmers could switch to corn if the 
switchgrass contract price is too low.  Also, the ethanol output of the biorefinery is assumed to 
be less than the market demand upper bound
9
, which means that no ethanol has to be put into 
storage.  Two different switchgrass contract types are modeled: the capacity procurement 
contract and the tonnage contract.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The “blend wall” is created by current regulation requiring the ethanol blended into gasoline be no more than 10% 
ethanol.  This is the biggest barrier faced by the ethanol industry in the US, and which may cause the demand for 
ethanol to be less than the supply. 
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3.3.1    Capacity Procurement Contract (CPC) 
3.3.1.1    Farmers’ Choice in a Capacity Procurement Contract 
3.3.1.1.1    Switchgrass Profit from a Capacity Procurement Contract 
In a capacity procurement contract, the biorefinery will pay a price for each unit of land 
allocated toward switchgrass production.  When accepting the biorefinery’s price offer, farmers 
will receive CPC
10
 per acre of land for all the switchgrass harvested to the biorefinery each year 
within the contract lifespan.  Therefore, a farmer’s gross revenue in each year from the land is 
(43)                                                       LSW CPC                                                 
where L represents the total acreage of land contracted in producing switchgrass. 
The profit of producing switchgrass under a capacity procurement contract at time   can be 
written by subtracting total cost swC  from total contract revenue SW : 
(44)                                                       swCSWt )(1  
Because of the assumption that the contract price, land usage and total cost are independent of 
time, farmers’ profit from growing switchgrass is also independent of time, that is, 
(45)                                                       )(11 LQcL tCPC                 
The expected net present value of growing switchgrass is achieved by discounting all of the 
future profit back to the initial time 0t .  The expected present value can be written as: 
(46)                                     dtLecEdtetE
T
rt
tCPC
T
rt

 
0
11
0
1 )(   
where   is the discount factor.  Faced with the proposed contract price CPC  from the biorefinery, 
an own-welfare maximizing farmer would choose the optimal level of land usage by maximizing 
the expected present value from growing switchgrass with the land constraint: 
                                                 
10
 The unit of capacity procurement contract price is dollars per acre. 
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(47)                                       dtLecE
T
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tCPC
L 
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0
111 max      
                                                        LLts     ..                      
where  ̅ is the total land owned by the farmer.  Therefore, the optimal level of profit is, 
(48)                                        dteLcE
T
rt
tCPC

0
111        
by using all the land  ̅ in switchgrass production.   
 
3.3.1.1.2    Choice between Switchgrass and Corn 
Farmers are willing to accept the contract price offer and supply switchgrass to the 
biorefinery each year thereafter only when the expected profit from growing switchgrass 1E  is 
no less than the expected profit from growing corn 0E , that is, 
(49)                                                     01  EE    
Or,  
(50)                                   dteLcPEdteLc rt
T
t
T
rt
tCPC

  20 20 11 )(     
In other words, 0E  is the minimum expected profit that the farmers require to grow 
switchgrass.  When the expected profit from producing switchgrass is less than that of producing 
corn, the farmers will not turn to switchgrass production.  They will still continue producing 
traditional crops like corn.  That means, the contract price of switchgrass should be high enough 
to cover the profit foregone from corn production and the cost of switchgrass production.  For 
example, when the corn yield 2  is high, which means it would probably be profitable producing 
corn, the switchgrass profit should also be high.  Therefore, the profit from producing corn is the 
opportunity cost for the farmers to enter into a contract.  When the expected net revenue from 
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switchgrass production is less than the corn opportunity cost, farmers would not switch from 
corn production. 
 
3.3.1.2    Capacity Procurement Contract Structure 
As a first-mover, the biorefinery would always propose the switchgrass contract price 
based on its expectation of the farmer’s optimal land usage.  The biorefinery would own all the 
bargaining power as a monopsonistic participant in switchgrass production.  The biorefinery 
would try to maximize its expected profit level while still giving the farmers enough incentive to 
participate in growing switchgrass.  Therefore, the capacity procurement contract structure can 
be written as 
                 dteE
rt
T
t
CPC

0max         01..  EEts      
The biorefinery is faced with the trade-off between obtaining high profit and providing enough 
incentive to the farmers.  To maximize its profit, the biorefinery needs to keep the contract price 
level as low as possible, because paying money to purchase switchgrass is a main cost to the 
biorefinery.  However, the switchgrass contract price cannot be too low, because then the 
farmers will not produce switchgrass and will produce corn instead.  More specifically, the 
switchgrass capacity procurement contract pricing problem can be rewritten as 
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Therefore, the optimal switchgrass contract price is 
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At this contract price level, the constraint in equation (51) is binding, which means that the 
contract price should be set in such a way that the expected profit from a switchgrass contract is 
the same as the expected profit from corn production for each farmer.  The switchgrass contract 
price is subject to the farmer’s expectation of future corn price, switchgrass and corn yields and 
production costs.  Substituting the expected corn price equation (35) into switchgrass price 
equation (52), the switchgrass price can be written as 
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The proof to equation (54) has been shown in the Appendix A.4.  When the contract lifespan 
increases ( T ), the switchgrass price will increase from equation (54) if the discount rate is 
large enough ( 2'2
2
1
 r ).  Moreover, the contracted switchgrass price will converge to a 
fixed level given a high discount rate as the contract lifespan increases accordingly, that is, 
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The biorefinery’s profit can then be calculated by substituting the switchgrass contract price into 
the biorefinery’s expected profit in equation (51).  Moreover, from equation (55), the following 
two results can be obtained theoretically: 
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a) a current high equilibrium corn price component (

0 ) will put the switchgrass contract 
price high.  For example, during the year that a drought causes the corn equilibrium price 
level to be high, the contract entered by the farmers in that year will specify a higher price 
than the regular years; 
b) if the corn price fluctuation is large, either from short-run impact (

1 ) or the long-run 
impact (

2 ), the switchgrass contract price will tend to be higher compared to the price of 
contracts entered in a year when the corn price is more stable. 
 
3.3.2    Tonnage Contract (TC) 
3.3.2. 1    Farmers’ Choice in a Tonnage Contract 
3.3.2.1.1    Switchgrass Profit from a Tonnage Contract 
Different from the capacity procurement contract, the tonnage contract specifies the 
switchgrass contract price according to the actual switchgrass yield instead of total acreage of 
land used in switchgrass production.  Under the tonnage contract, the switchgrass is paid by the 
biorefinery for each unit (e.g. ton) of switchgrass harvested.  Farmers need to provide the entire 
switchgrass yield to the biorefinery.  Therefore, the biorefinery’s total switchgrass procurement 
cost will be: 
(56)                                                      )(LQWS tTC  
where TC
11
 represents the switchgrass contract price under a tonnage contract.  And the 
farmers’ profit of producing switchgrass at time t is: 
                                    swCWSt 

)(1  
                                                 
11
 The unit of tonnage contract is dollars per ton. 
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which can be written as 
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
  
The expected net present value of growing switchgrass is achieved by discounting all of 
the future profit back to the initial time 0t . The expected present value can be written as: 
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where r is the discount factor. 
Similar to the farmers’ decision under the capacity procurement contract, farmers’ land 
allocation in switchgrass can be obtained by maximizing the expected profit level under the land 
constraint: 
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The optimal profit level is, 
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3.3.2.1.2    Choice between Switchgrass and Corn 
The biorefinery needs to provide enough revenue to the farmers to guarantee that the 
farmers have enough incentive to produce switchgrass instead of corn, that is, 
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which means the farmer will be willing to produce switchgrass only when there will be higher 
expected profit level than that from producing corn.   
 
3.3.2.2    Tonnage Contract Structure 
In the tonnage contract, the biorefinery will try to maximize its own profit while 
providing the farmers enough incentive to produce switchgrass.  The tonnage contract structure 
can be written as: 
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Substituting equations (58) into (63), the switchgrass tonnage contract structure can be rewritten 
as 
(64)                          dteLLmsOMCtSE rt
T
tTCt
TC

 0 11))((max       
                                  dteLcPEdteLcts rt
T
t
T
rt
tTC

  20 20 11 )(..       
Therefore, the optimal switchgrass contract price under a tonnage contract is: 
(65)                                             
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At this price level, the constraint in equation (64) is also binding which means that the expected 
profit from switchgrass contract is the same as the profit from growing corn during the contract 
lifespan.  Moreover, substituting the corn price expectation equation (35) into the equation (65) 
above, the switchgrass contract price can be written as 
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When the contract lifespan increases, if the discount rate is high enough, 2'2
2
1
 r , the 
contract price under tonnage contract will increase to a fixed level: 
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The biorefinery’s profit level can then be estimated by substituting the switchgrass tonnage 
contract price into the biorefinery’s expected profit function in equation (64).   
Therefore, the following results can be obtained from equation (67): 
a) the higher the equilibrium corn price level, the higher the switchgrass contract price will be; 
b) during the years with high corn price fluctuations 

1  and 

2 , the switchgrass contract price 
will tend to be higher than the contract price with more stable price changes. 
 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
In summary, when the biorefinery is a monopsonistic buyer, the biorefinery will propose 
to each individual farmer a contract in which a contract price is specified.  The contract can 
either be a capacity procurement contract in which the price is specified for each acre of land 
allocated towards switchgrass production or be a tonnage contract in which the switchgrass 
procurement price is specified for each ton of switchgrass purchased from this farmer.  The 
contract price level is given in equation (52) under a capacity procurement contract and in 
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equation (65) under a tonnage contract.  It can be seen from these contract pricing formulas that 
the CPC or TC prices will be affected by the land productivity for both the switchgrass and the 
corn, which means that the prices will be different for farmers owning different lands.  
Therefore, the biorefinery can specify different contract prices based on each farmer’s land type.  
The monopsonistic biorefinery will gain the largest possible profit through the price 
discrimination process by providing the individual farmer with specific contract price. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA 
 
4.1 Ethanol Futures Price Data 
 
Ethanol futures contracts have been traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
for only a few years.  The CME launched corn-based ethanol contracts on March 23, 2005, with 
floor-based trading.  Ethanol futures can be delivered every month of every year.  The price of 
ethanol futures contract price is quoted on the CME by dollar per gallon.  One ethanol contract is 
standardized to contain 29,000 gallons of ethanol.  To guarantee the sample size is large enough 
for empirical tests, the data used to test the ethanol empirical valuation model consist of daily 
observations of ethanol futures prices from August 29, 2009 to August 31, 2012.  For each date, 
prices for the futures contracts maturing in 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 months were used.  Table 1 describes 
the characteristics, mean value and standard deviation, of the ethanol futures price data collected 
for each type of contract.  With longer maturities, the futures contract price is lower, and the 
price standard deviation is also lower.  Moreover, the range of the ethanol futures price for the 
contracts maturing in one month during this period is $1.40 - $4.23 per gallon, compared to the 
price range for the contracts maturing in 3 months ($1.40 - $3.16 per gallon), 5 months ($1.45 - 
$2.92 per gallon), 7 months ($1.46 - $2.90 per gallon) and 9 months ($1.47 - $2.88 per gallon). 
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Table 1    Ethanol Futures Contract Data 
 
Contract Maturity 
Mean Price 
($ per gallon) 
Price Standard Deviation 
($ per gallon) 
1 month 2.14 0.4265 
3 months 2.08 0.3740 
5 months 2.05 0.3459 
7 months 2.02 0.3244 
9 months 2.01 0.3091 
* From August 29, 2009 to August 31, 2012: 1767 Daily Observations 
 
 
4.2 Corn Futures Price Data 
 
Corn futures contracts are among the earliest contracts traded on the CME.  The 
maturities of corn futures are in March, May, July, September, and December of each year.  The 
corn futures contracts are standardized to be 5,000 bushels per contract and the corn futures price 
is quoted in cents per bushel on the CME.  In this analysis weekly observations of corn futures 
prices are used to test the corn empirical valuation model from January 6, 1997 to December 29, 
2011.  For each date, prices for the futures contracts with maturity 1, 5, 9, 13 and 17 months 
were used.  The corn futures price data characteristics, mean value and standard deviation, for 
each type of contract are described in Table 2.  Moreover, the range of the corn futures price for 
the contracts maturing in one month during this period is $1.86 - $7.87 per bushel, compared to 
the price range for the contracts maturing in 5 month ($2.80 - $7.88 per bushel), 9 months ($2.18 
- $8.05), 13 months ($2.34- $8.16) and 17 months ($2.38 - $7.00). 
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Table 2    Corn Futures Contract Data 
 
Contract Maturity 
Mean Price 
($ per bushel) 
Price Standard Deviation 
($ per bushel) 
1 month 3.15 1.43 
5 months 3.23 1.45 
9 months 3.30 1.37 
13 months 3.35 1.32 
17 months 3.37 1.25 
* From January 6, 1997 to December 29, 2011: 756 Weekly Observations 
 
 
4.3 Ethanol Production Data 
 
Four parameters are involved in the ethanol production process: the biorefinery’s 
operation and maintenance cost, transportation cost, storage cost, and conversion rate.  The 
estimations of these parameters vary in the current literature.  Using west Tennessee as the basis 
in this analysis, the plant operation and maintenance cost is assumed to be $0.75 per gallon 
(Haque and Epplin 2012).  The variability of transportation cost is demonstrated in Table 3.  It 
ranges from $6.48 per ton to $13.86 per ton.  The base value in this analysis is $10 per ton within 
a 25 mile distance.  The storage cost is assumed to be $3.83 per dry ton for round bales and 
$17.84 per dry ton for square bales (Wang et al. 2009).   
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Table 3    Transportation Cost Rate Data 
 
Source 
Transportation Cost Rate  
($ per dry ton) 
Walsh et al. (1998)   5 to 8 * 
Duffy (2007)      6.10 ** 
Duffy and Nanhou (2001)         5 to 10 *** 
Larson et al. (2005)                       10 (Base Value) 
Perrin et al. (2008) 13 
* Within a 25 mile distance 
** Within a 30-mile trip 
*** Within a 75 mile distance 
 
 
The conversion rate is shown in Table 4.  The conversion rate of switchgrass into ethanol 
ranges from 59.92 gallons per ton to 99.95 gallons per ton with regard to different firm size and 
technology used.  The base rate of 80.05 gallons per ton for medium-sized biorefinery firms is 
used from Haque and Epplin (2012). 
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Table 4    Estimation of Switchgrass Conversion Rate (Haque and Epplin 2012) 
 
Source 
Conversion Rate 
(gallons per ton) 
Haque and Epplin (2012) 99.95 
Aden et al. (2002) 90.12 
Schmer et al. (2008) 82.69 
Haque and Epplin (2012)                       80.05 (Base Value) 
Humbird et al. (2011) 79.09 
Sendich et al. (2008) 77.90 
Wingren et al. (2003) 76.94 
Wingren et al. (2004) 73.10 
Sendich et al. (2008) 69.99 
Wu et al. (2010) 69.99 
Kazi et al. (2010) 69.03 
Wingren et al. (2003) 67.11 
Eggeman and Elander (2005) 64.95 
Haque and Epplin (2012) 59.92 
* Variation in conversion rate assumptions reflects the difference in ethanol production technology with regard to different firm size. 
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4.4 Switchgrass Production Data 
 
4.4.1 Switchgrass Yields 
 According to Mooney et al. (2009), the first- and second- year switchgrass yields are 14% 
and 60% respectively of the third-year yield which can be considered as the maximum yield 
(Griffith et al. 2012).  The switchgrass maximum yield varies in the current literature.  Table 5 is 
a summary of the switchgrass yield estimations.  The estimation ranges from 3.79 tons per acre 
to 7.89 tons per acre.  Generally speaking, the yields in northern states are less than those in 
southern states because of the variation between upland and lowland. 
 Land in West Tennessee is divided into four different landscapes (Mooney et al. 2009; 
Boyer et al. 2012): (i) a well-drained level upland (WDLU), (ii) a well- to moderately well-
drained floodplain (WDFP), (iii) a moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland 
(MDSU), (iv) a poorly drained floodplain (PDFP).  The relative position of these four landscapes 
is demonstrated in Figure 2.  The average switchgrass yield between 2006 and 2011 from each 
landscape is shown in Table 6 (Boyer et al. 2012). 
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Table 5    Switchgrass Yield Estimation Data 
 
Source 
Switchgrass Yields  
(tons per acre) 
Walsh et al. (2003) 5.49 
Duffy (2007) 4.00 
Khanna et al. (2008) 4.20 
Pimentel and Patzek (2005) 4.91 
Fike et al. (2006) 5.45 
McLaughlin and Kszos (2005) 6.16 
Muir et al. (2001) 5.97 
Epplin et al. (2007) 6.06 
* Variation reflects differences in location and land type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  well-drained level upland 
**  well- to moderately well-drained floodplain 
***  moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland 
****  poorly drained floodplain 
Figure 2    Four Landscapes in Tennessee 
 
 
(IV) PDFP**** 
(II) WDFP** 
(I) WDLU* 
(III) MDSU*** 
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Table 6    Switchgrass Yield from Four Landscapes in Tennessee (Boyer et al. 2012) 
 
Landscape 
Yield  
(tons per acre) 
WDLU * 7.65 
 WDFP ** 8.33 
    MDSU *** 8.64 
     PDFP **** 6.62 
*  well-drained level upland 
**  well- to moderately well-drained floodplain 
***  moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland 
****  poorly drained floodplain 
 
 
4.4.2 Switchgrass Breakeven Price 
 The estimated average production cost, or farm-gate breakeven price, of switchgrass also 
varies in the literature.  Table 7 shows breakeven price estimations done by researchers in 
different states and range from $45.91 per dry ton to $94.80 per dry ton and reflects differences 
in farm-gate price or price delivered to biorefineries.  Based on the research done by Mooney et 
al. (2009) and Boyer et al. (2012), the breakeven price of producing switchgrass on four types of 
landscapes in west Tennessee is shown in Table 8. 
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Table 7    Switchgrass Breakeven Price Estimations  
 
Source 
Breakeven Price Estimation  
($ per dry ton) 
Duffy (2007) 91.05 
Khanna et al. (2008) 88.9 
Perrin et al. (2008) 53.52 
Mooney et al. (2009) $42.90 to $62.23 
Epplin et al. (2007) 50.80 
Walsh et al. (2003) 49.91 
* Variation in method of storage, payment of transportation, and storage costs. 
 
 
 
Table 8    Switchgrass Breakeven Price for Four Landscapes in Tennessee  
(Mooney et al. 2012; Boyer et al. 2012) 
  
Landscape 
Breakeven Price  
($ per ton) 
WDLU * 53.10 
 WDFP ** 48.31 
    MDSU *** 49.76 
     PDFP **** 58.14 
*  well-drained level upland 
**  well- to moderately well-drained floodplain 
***  moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland 
****  poorly drained floodplain 
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4.5 Corn Production Data 
 
 Based on the tests done on corn grain yield in Tennessee by Allen et al. from 2007 to 
2012 for 17 early-season corn hybrids and the field crop budget made by the University of 
Tennessee Extension, the average yield of corn was assumed to be 150 bushels per acre for 
traditional croplands.  The corn yield on marginal lands is much lower than that grown on 
traditional croplands.  Varvel et al. (2008) reported that the average yield of corn on marginal 
land is roughly 97 bushels per acre based on different levels of nitrogen application.  The 
average cost of growing corn is estimated to be $450.52 per acre according to the field crop 
budgets for 2013 made by the University of Tennessee Extension (McKinley and Gerloff 2013). 
 
 
Table 9    Corn Yield from Four Landscapes in Tennessee  
 
Landscape 
Yield  
(bushels per acre) 
Traditional Crop Production Land 
WDLU * 
150 
WDFP ** 
Marginal Land 
MDSU *** 
97 
 PDFP **** 
*  well-drained level upland 
  
**  well- to moderately well-drained floodplain 
 
***  moderate to somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland 
 
****  poorly drained floodplain 
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4.6 Summary of Production Parameters 
 
 Table 10 indicates the production parameters used in this analysis to represent a case 
situation in west Tennessee.  The first column displays the symbols used in Chapter III.  The 
second column describes the symbols in the first column.  The third column shows the value of 
the parameters in this analysis.
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Table 10    Summary of Production Parameters for the West Tennessee Case Study 
 
Symbol Description Base Value 
  Conversion Rate (gallons per ton) 80 
  Storage Cost ($ per ton) 3.83 
  Transportation Cost ($ per ton) 10 
OMC Plant and Maintenance Average Cost ($ per gallon) 0.75 
  Discount Rate 8% 
 ̅ Land Endowment (acres)    133 * 
   
Average Yield of Switchgrass 
(tons per acre) 
WDFP 7.65 
WDLU 8.33 
MDSU 8.64 
PDFP 6.62 
   
Average Cost of Switchgrass 
($ per ton) 
WDFP 53.10 
WDLU 48.31 
MDSU 49.76 
PDFP 58.14 
   
Average Yield of Corn 
(bushels per acre) 
WDFP 150 
WDLU 150 
MDSU 97 
PDFP 97 
  ̅** 
Average Cost of Corn 
($ per acre) 
450.52 
*Land endowment is assumed to be the average farm acreage in Tennessee (Jensen et al. 2007). 
**   ̅      
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
5.1 Expected Ethanol Price 
 
 The Kalman filtering process is used to estimate the ethanol spot price and the 
expectation of ethanol price in the future based on the historical data of the ethanol futures 
prices.  The parameters in the state space model, equations (18) and (19) in Chapter III, can be 
calculated efficiently through the maximum likelihood estimation shown in Appendix A.3.  By 
varying the parameters and rerunning the Kalman filter for each initial group of parameters, the 
parameters that maximize the log-likelihood function can be identified (Schwartz and Smith 
2000).  Under the five contracts with five different maturity lengths, the parameters to be 
estimated are  , 1 , 2 ,  , 
* , 1 ,   and H , plus the variance-covariance matrix of 
measurement error H ( 4321 ,,, ssss     and 5s ).  To guarantee that the parameters obtained are the 
global maximum estimator, different initial values are used to solve the optimization problem.  
Using the ethanol futures data from August 29, 2005 to August 31, 2012, the maximum 
likelihood estimators are shown in Table 11. 
 All the estimated parameters are significant at the 1% level (Table 11).  The estimated 
values of measurement error standard deviation are small, which indicates that the ethanol 
futures pricing equation (17) describes the futures pricing mechanism well.  Furthermore, using 
the average 1-month and 5-month ethanol futures prices from May 5, 2005 to December 31, 
2012, $2.13 and $2.00 per gallon, the current short-run price deviation component 0  and the 
long-run equilibrium price component 0  can be estimated: 
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13.2)exp( 00   and 00.2)exp( 0   
Therefore, 06.00   and 69.00  . 
  
 
Table 11    Maximum-Likelihood Parameter Estimates (Ethanol) 
 
Parameter Description 
 
Estimate Standard Error  
  Short-term Mean reverting rate 
 
0.80 0.0850 
   Short-term volatility  
0.58 0.0431 
   Equilibrium volatility  
0.40 0.0353 
  Equilibrium drift rate 
 
0.02 0.1226 
   Risk-neutral equilibrium drift rate  
 
0.15 0.0302 
   Short-term market price of risks  
0.46 0.0394 
  Correlation in increments 
 
-0.74 0.0506 
  
Contract 
Maturity   
   Standard deviation for measurement error 1 month 0.044 0.0008 
   Standard deviation for measurement error 2 months 0.004 0.0005 
   Standard deviation for measurement error 3 months 0.019 0.0003 
   Standard deviation for measurement error 4 months 0.018 0.0003 
   Standard deviation for measurement error 5 months 0.007 0.0004 
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The estimated spot market price of ethanol, subject to the maximum-likelihood 
parameters, is shown in Figure 3, and in relation to the futures price with the closest maturity (1 
month).  The ethanol spot price and the 1-month-to-maturity futures contract price coincide 
(Figure 3) which is consistent with the theory that the futures price and spot price are converging 
to each other as the futures contract approaches maturity.   
 
 
 
Figure 3    Estimated Ethanol Spot Market Price and One-Month Ethanol Futures Price 
 
 With the estimated parameters in Table 11, the expected ethanol price movement can be 
calculated from equation (14) in Chapter III.  The projected ethanol prices in the following five 
years (2014-2018) are displayed in Table 12.  The ethanol price will be between $2.10 and $2.18 
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per gallon.  This is very close to the ethanol effective retail price forecasted by the Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri ($2.00-2.06 per 
bushel from 2014 to 2018) (FAPRI-MU 2013).  The projected ethanol price will first decrease 
and then increase after 2015.    
 
Table 12    The Ethanol Price* Forecast (2014-2018)  
 
      
Years 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Price 
($ per gallon) 
2.11 2.10 2.11 2.14 2.18 
* in 2013 dollars 
 
 
5.2 Expected Corn Price 
 
 Similar to section 5.1, the maximum-likelihood corn price estimators can also be obtained 
through Kalman filter process.  The parameters to be estimated are:  , 

1 , 

2 ,  , 
* , 

1 ,
  and H  , plus the variance-covariance matrix of measurement error H   (

4321 ,,, ssss     and 

5s ).  Table 13 presents the maximum-likelihood estimators in the corn pricing process.  
Different initial parameter values have also been tried to guarantee that the log-likelihood value 
is the largest.  The data used are the corn futures prices with 1-month, 5-month, 9-month, 13-
month, and 17-month left to maturity from January 6, 1997 to December 29, 2011.  
 All the estimated parameters are significant at the 1% level, which means that the 
Kalman filter has used the historical data efficiently and the corn pricing model describes the 
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corn price movement.  Furthermore, using the average September and October price of 1-month 
and 17-month corn futures contracts from 2007 to 2012, $5.19 and $5.37 per bushel accordingly, 
the current short-run price deviation component and the long-run equilibrium price component '0
and '0  can be estimated: 
19.5)exp( '0
'
0   and 37.5)exp(
'
0   
Therefore, 03.0 '0  and 68.1
'
0  . 
 
Table 13    Maximum-Likelihood Parameter Estimates (Corn) 
 
Parameter Description 
 
Estimate Standard Error  
   Short-term Mean reverting rate 
 
0.51 0.0661 
    Short-term volatility  
0.32 0.0257 
    Equilibrium volatility  
0.19 0.0153 
   Equilibrium drift rate 
 
0.02 0.0481 
    Risk-neutral equilibrium drift rate 
 
-0.17 0.0214 
    Short-term market price of risks  
-0.09 0.0340 
   Correlation in increments 
 
-0.33 0.1182 
  
Contract 
Maturity 
  
    Standard deviation for measurement error 1 month 0.008 0.0020 
    Standard deviation for measurement error 5 months -0.016 0.0010 
    Standard deviation for measurement error 9 months 0.019 0.0006 
    Standard deviation for measurement error 13 months -0.012 0.0017 
    Standard deviation for measurement error 17 months -0.023 0.0020 
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Figure 4 displays the spot market price of corn estimated under the maximum-likelihood 
parameters in Table 2.  The current futures prices with 1-month left to maturity are also depicted 
in Figure 4.  The corn spot price and the 1-month futures price coincide which is consistent with 
the theory that the futures price converges to the spot price as the contract gets closer to 
expiration (Hull 2009).  
 
 
Figure 4    Estimated Corn Spot Market Price and One-Month Corn Futures Price 
 
 
Using the estimated parameters in Table 13, the expected corn price path in the future can 
be estimated from equation (34) in Chapter III.  The estimated prices in the following five years 
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are shown in Table 14.  The projected price is also close to the corn farm price projected by 
FAPRI between 2014 and 2018, $5.18-4.83 per bushel (FAPRI 2013).  The corn price projection 
shows a trend of decreasing in next a few years. 
 
Table 14    The Corn Price* Forecast (2014-2018) 
  
Years 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Price  
($ per bushel) 
5.45 5.29 5.10 4.89 4.69 
* in 2013 dollars 
 
 
 
5.3 Switchgrass Capacity Procurement Contract 
 
5.3.1 Switchgrass CPC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profitability 
 In this analysis, a five-year contract lifespan assumption is adopted.  Based on the 
capacity procurement contract structure (equation (51)) and the assumption that the first year’s 
and the second year’s harvest are only 14% and 60% of the third, fourth, and fifth year’s harvest, 
which means that %141  , %602  , and %100543    (Mooney et al. 2009), the 
switchgrass contract price under the capacity procurement contract can be estimated from 
equation (52).  Besides the projections of the corn price and ethanol price in the following 5 
years (2014-2018), the information in Table 10 is also used.  Moreover, the contract price will be 
affected by the land quality on which the switchgrass is grown.  The west Tennessee per acre 
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contract prices for four types of landscapes (WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP) under a five-
year capacity procurement contract are shown in Table 15. 
Table 15  CPC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profit Estimation 
 
 
Landscapes 
Contract Price 
(dollars per acre)  
Biorefinery’s Profit* 
(in thousand dollars) 
Traditional Cropland 
WDFP 795 13.5 
WDLU 792 53.7 
Marginal Land 
MDSU 474 240.1 
PDFP 442 142.2 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
 
 The per acre contract prices on traditional croplands (WDFP and WDLU) are much 
higher than per acre prices on the marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP) ($795 and $792 per acre 
compared to $474 and $442 per acre).  The price of switchgrass grown on a well- to moderately 
well-drained floodplain (WDFP) is the highest ($795/acre) while the price of switchgrass grown 
on a poorly drained floodplain (PDFP) is the lowest ($442/acre).  The reason for the large price 
difference shown in Table 15 is due to the large difference in corn yields grown on traditional 
croplands and marginal lands.  The yield of corn on traditional croplands is much larger than that 
on marginal land (150 bushels per acre compared to 97 bushels per acre).  Considering that the 
corn price is relatively high since 2007 compared to the price level in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
the corn farmers will have a relatively high profit level from traditional croplands.  Therefore, 
the biorefinery will have to propose a high switchgrass contract price to encourage the farmers to 
switch to growing switchgrass instead of growing corn.  However, because the corn yields on 
marginal lands are relatively low, though the corn price is relatively high, the total corn profit 
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level will still be much lower than that from traditional croplands.  Therefore, a lower contract 
price will be a suitable proposal by the biorefinery to those farmers on marginal lands.  
Consequently, the farmers’ expected profit, total switchgrass revenue minus explicit switchgrass 
production cost, from each contract (5 years, 133 acres) can also be calculated.  On WDFP and 
WDLU lands, the expected profit from each contract is $267.9 thousand, and on MDSU and 
PDFP lands, the expected profit from each contract is $88.7 thousand. 
 Because the capacity procurement contract prices proposed on different landscapes are 
different, the biorefinery’s profits also vary based on different land types (Table 15).  The 
projected profits from the contracts in turn affect the biorefinery’s selection of the farmer with 
whom to sign a contract.  From the biorefinery’s profit function in equation (51), the switchgrass 
contract prices that make the biorefinery breakeven under four landscapes (WDFP, WDLU, 
MDSU, and PDFP) can be estimated, which are $820, 893, 927, and 710 per acre with regard to 
the contracts signed with farmers on WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP lands.  The estimated 
contract prices are all lower than these prices.  That indicates the biorefinery will have positive 
profit from each contract regardless of the type of land the farmer owns.  Moreover, the expected 
profit the biorefinery can get from each contract on each type of landscape is shown in Table 15.  
There is a significant profit difference between the contract on traditional croplands and marginal 
lands.  The estimated biorefinery profits from traditional croplands are much lower than that 
from marginal lands ($13.5 thousand and $53.7 thousand compared to $240.1 thousand and 
$142.2 thousand).  Therefore, the biorefinery will not choose to sign capacity procurement 
contracts with farmers on traditional croplands (WDFP and WDLU) if they can sign contracts 
with farmers on marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP).  Moreover, the profit from MDSU land is 
notably higher than the profit from PDFP land ($240.1 thousand compared to $142.2 thousand 
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per contract) though the contract prices are close to each other ($474 per acre compared to $442 
per acre).  The reason is that the average yield of switchgrass on MDSU is higher than that on 
PDFP (8.64 tons per acre compared to 6.62 tons per acre), and the average cost of switchgrass 
production on MDSU is lower than that on PDFP ($49.76 per ton compared to $58.14 per ton).  
Therefore, the biorefinery can not only purchase the switchgrass at a lower price, but also have a 
larger average supply from farmers on MDSU lands.   
The expected ethanol price level also limits the biorefinery’s profit prediction.  The 
current technology limits the ability of making ethanol out of switchgrass, that is, the conversion 
rate limits the biorefinery’s profitability.  With the advance of technology in converting 
switchgrass into ethanol, the conversion rate will be higher.  Then the biorefinery will have the 
ability to produce more ethanol out of a fixed amount of switchgrass, which will increase its 
revenue and promote profitability.  In all, at current circumstances, the biorefinery will prefer to 
sign capacity procurement contracts with farmers on marginal lands, especially with farmers on 
the MDSU lands. 
 As indicated above, the switchgrass CPC price is composed of two parts: the switchgrass 
production cost and corn profit.  The switchgrass CPC price not only needs to cover the 
switchgrass production cost, but also needs to cover the potential profit from alternative land 
usage, such as producing corn.  Figure 5 shows the percentages in switchgrass capacity 
procurement contract prices from these two components under the four landscapes.  For 
example, on the WDFP land, 36.5% of the CPC price ($290 out of $795 per acre) is to cover the 
switchgrass production cost, while 63.5% of the CPC price ($505 out of $795 per acre) is to 
cover the opportunity cost from the potential to produce corn.  In contrast, on the MDSU land, 
64.8% of the CPC price ($307 out of $474 per acre) is to cover the switchgrass production cost, 
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while 35.2% of the CPC price ($167 out of $474 per acre) is to cover the corn potential profit.  
Therefore, on traditional croplands (WDFP and WDLU), the potential gain from producing corn 
has a larger share in switchgrass CPC price determination than the switchgrass production cost.  
However, on marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP), the switchgrass production cost is the key 
determinant and has a larger share in switchgrass CPC price determination than corn profit.  
Therefore, when corn price increases, the CPC price for switchgrass on traditional croplands will 
react to a larger extent than that of switchgrass grown on marginal lands; however, the advance 
in switchgrass production technology which lowers the switchgrass production cost will affect 
the CPC price on marginal lands to a larger extent. 
 
                    
Figure 5    Percentages in CPC Price from Switchgrass Cost and Corn Profit 
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5.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Four key factors play important roles in switchgrass pricing: corn price forecast, 
switchgrass average yield, corn average yield, and discount rate.  The corn price has been 
forecast in Section 5.2, and the switchgrass average yield, corn yield, and the discount rate are 
based on the estimations in current literature.  The estimated switchgrass CPC price has been 
given in Table 15.  Through sensitivity analysis, the impacts of the change in these factors on 
switchgrass CPC price can be analyzed. 
If the corn price projection decreases by 10%, the projected corn prices will be $4.91, 
$4.76, $4.59, $4.40, and $4.22 per bushel in each year from 2014 to 2018.  Table 16 shows the 
new switchgrass price estimation and percentage change after revising the corn price forecast.  
The contract price then will be $699 per acre for switchgrass grown on WDFP and $697 per acre 
for switchgrass on WDLU compared to $413 per acre and $380 per acre for MDSU and PDFP 
respectively.  The decrease in switchgrass contract price is relatively the same among these four 
types of lands, ranging from 11.9% to 14.1% following the 10% decrease in corn price forecast.  
Therefore, the elasticities of corn price projection on CPC contract price are approximately 1.21, 
1.19, 1.29, and 1.41 for switchgrass grown on WDFP, WDLU, MSDU, and PDFP lands 
accordingly.  That indicates that the switchgrass CPC price is sensitive to the corn price 
projection, and the switchgrass CPC price decrease on marginal lands is slightly larger than the 
price decrease on traditional croplands.  The switchgrass contract price needs to be adjusted by a 
higher percentage than the corresponding change in corn price projection.  Accordingly, the 
biorefinery’s profit will increase if the CPC price decreases (Table 16).  Contracts on MDSU 
land continues to bring the highest profits for the biorefinery among these four landscapes.  
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Table 16  Impact of 10% Decrease in Corn Price Forecast on  Switchgrass CPC Price and 
the Biorefinery’s Profit 
 
Landscapes 
New Switchgrass Price 
(dollars per acre) 
% Decrease in 
Switchgrass Price 
Biorefinery’s Profit* 
 (in thousand dollars) 
WDFP 699 12.1 64.3 
WDLU 697 11.9 104.4 
MDSU 413 12.9 $272.9 
PDFP 380 14.1 $175.0 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
 
When the switchgrass yields increase by 10%, the new switchgrass yield levels will be 
8.41, 9.16, 9.50, and 7.28 tons per acre for WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP respectively.  
Table 17 reports the impact on switchgrass CPC prices if the switchgrass yields increase by 10%.  
The switchgrass CPC price increases following the increase in switchgrass yield.  The 
switchgrass price on MDSU and PDFP is more sensitive to the switchgrass yields (6.5% and 
6.3%) compared to the WDFP and WDLU lands (3.7% and 3.7%).  Therefore, the elasticities of 
switchgrass yield on switchgrass CPC price are 0.37, 0.37, 0.65, and 0.63 for switchgrass grown 
on WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP accordingly.  For all four landscapes, the switchgrass 
yield does not have a very strong impact on switchgrass price: the switchgrass CPC price 
increases by a lesser percentage than the increase in switchgrass yield.  Moreover, the CPC price 
adjustments on marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP) are much higher (almost doubled) than that 
on traditional croplands (WDFP and WDLU), which indicates on less-fertile lands, the yield of 
switchgrass is more critical in switchgrass CPC price determination than that on more fertile 
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lands.  The biorefinery’s profit will increase, but will not change the fact that the biorefinery will 
prefer to sign contracts with farmers on marginal lands. 
 
 
Table 17  Impact of 10% Increase in Switchgrass Yield on Switchgrass CPC Price and the 
Biorefinery’s Profit 
 
Landscapes 
New Switchgrass Price 
(dollars per acre) 
% Increase in 
Switchgrass Price 
Biorefinery’s Profit* 
(in thousand dollars) 
WDFP 824 3.7 41.5 
WDLU 821 3.7 85.8 
MDSU 505 6.5 272.9 
PDFP 470 6.3 165.2 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
 
 
If the corn yields decrease by 10%, the new corn yields levels will be 135 bushels per 
acre and 87 bushels per acre for traditional croplands and marginal lands accordingly.  Table 18 
shows the impact of corn yield changes on switchgrass CPC Prices.  The switchgrass price will 
decrease following the decrease in corn yields.  For a 10% decrease in corn yields, the CPC 
prices decrease by 12.1%, 11.9%, 13.3%, and 14.3% for switchgrass grown on WDPF, WDLU, 
MDSU, and PDFP accordingly.  Therefore, the elasticities of corn yields on switchgrass CPC 
price are approximately 1.21, 1.19, 1.33, and 1.43 for each of these four types of land.  The corn 
yields have a large impact on the switchgrass CPC price: the CPC price decreases by a larger 
percentage than the decrease in corn yields.  The biorefinery’s profit increases when the corn 
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yields decreases, but still, the biorefinery will prefer to sign contracts with farmers on marginal 
lands. 
 
 
Table 18  Impact of 10% Decrease in Corn Yield on Switchgrass CPC Price and the 
Biorefinery’s Profit 
 
Landscapes 
New Switchgrass Price 
(dollars per acre) 
% Decrease in 
Switchgrass Price 
Biorefinery’s Profit* 
(in thousand dollars) 
WDFP 699 12.1 64.3 
WDLU 697 11.9 104.2 
MDSU 411 13.3 273.8 
PDFP 379 14.3 175.7 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
 
 
If farmers perceive switchgrass production to be more risky compared to corn production, 
the discount rate considered by the farmers for switchgrass production will be higher.  Therefore, 
a 10% discount rate is assumed for switchgrass production while keeping the discount rate for 
ethanol production and corn production at 8%.  The switchgrass CPC price and the biorefinery’s 
profit can be re-estimated.  Table 19 shows the switchgrass CPC price and the biorefinery’s 
profit level on four landscapes under the 10% switchgrass production discount rate.  The 
biorefinery needs to raise the contract price when the farmers believe that the switchgrass 
production contract contains higher risks.  Consequently, the biorefinery’s profit will decrease 
following the increase in the switchgrass capacity procurement contract prices.   
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Table 19  Switchgrass CPC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profit under 10% Discount Rate 
 
Landscapes 
Switchgrass Price 
(dollars per acre) 
% Increase in 
Switchgrass Price 
Biorefinery’s Profit* 
(in thousand dollars) 
WDFP 818 3.0 1.1 
WDLU 816 3.0 41.2 
MDSU 480 1.2 237.3 
PDFP 448 1.3 139.1 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
 
 
5.4 Switchgrass Tonnage Contract 
 
5.4.1 Switchgrass TC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profitability 
 Similar to the capacity procurement contract, a five-year stand switchgrass tonnage 
contract is assumed to be the contract lifespan for both the biorefinery and farmers.  Based on the 
tonnage contract pricing equation (64) and the assumption that the first year’s and second year’s 
harvest is only 14% and 60% of the yield in the third, fourth and fifth year ( %141  , 
%602  , and %100543   ) (Mooney et al. 2009), the switchgrass contract prices 
under the tonnage contract are shown in Table 20.  The switchgrass TC prices are also affected 
by the type of landscape on which the switchgrass is grown.  Using west Tennessee as a case 
study, Table 20 shows the contract price for each of the four typical landscapes (WDFP, WDLU, 
MDSU, and PDFP) under a five-year stand (2014-2018) switchgrass tonnage contract. 
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Table 20  TC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profit Estimation 
 
Landscape 
Contract Price 
(dollars per ton)  
Biorefinery’s Profit* 
(in thousand dollars) 
Traditional Cropland 
WDFP 145 13.6 
WDLU 133 53.7 
Marginal Land 
MDSU 77 240.1 
PDFP 93 142.2 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
  
Similar to the CPC price, the tonnage contract prices on traditional croplands (WDFP and 
WDLU) are much higher than the prices on the marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP).  The per ton 
price of switchgrass grown on a well- to moderately well-drained floodplain (WDFP) is the 
highest ($145/ton) while the per ton price of switchgrass grown on a moderate-to-somewhat-
poorly-drained eroded sloping upland (MDSU) is the lowest ($77/ton).  The TC price on WDLU 
land ($133 per ton) is similar to the price on WDFP land, and the TC price on PDFP land ($93 
per ton) is similar to the price on MDSU land.  The price difference between switchgrass on 
traditional croplands and switchgrass on marginal lands is due to the large difference in corn 
yields grown on traditional croplands and marginal lands (150 bushels per acre compared to 97 
bushels per acre).  With the corn price prediction in the following five years, a relatively high 
corn profit level can be expected on traditional croplands.  Therefore, the biorefinery needs to 
propose a high enough switchgrass TC price level to give the farmers incentive to grow 
switchgrass.  In contrast, because the corn yields on marginal lands are relatively low, though the 
corn price can be expected to be high, the total profit level will still be much lower than that from 
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traditional croplands.  Therefore, a low contract price can be proposed by the biorefinery to those 
farmers on marginal lands. 
 Compared to the estimated breakeven prices in current literature (Table 7), the tonnage 
contract price on traditional land is much higher than estimated breakeven prices.  One reason is 
that most breakeven estimates do not take the opportunity cost from alternative land usage into 
account.  Therefore, during the recent years when the corn price is high, the contract price in this 
analysis also needs to be high to compensate the farmers’ potential loss on corn production.  This 
is especially the case on traditional croplands.  Moreover, the tonnage contract price estimated in 
this analysis on the marginal lands is only slightly higher than the breakeven prices estimated in 
other research, such as Mooney et al. (2009).  This suggests that the opportunity cost to grow 
switchgrass on marginal lands is much lower compared to the traditional croplands. 
 Table 20 also shows the biorefinery’s profit level.  The biorefinery will prefer to buy the 
switchgrass from the farmers planting on marginal lands.  Farmers on MDSU lands will be the 
first choice for the biorefinery to offer a switchgrass tonnage contract.  Similar to the capacity 
procurement contract, besides switchgrass contract price difference, the low ethanol price 
forecast and limitation in current conversion rate are also the main factors restricting the 
biorefinery’s profitability.   
 For each landscape, the switchgrass TC price is also determined by the switchgrass 
production cost and corn profit.  On WDFP land, 36.5% of the TC price ($52.9 out of $145 per 
ton) is to cover the switchgrass production cost, while 63.5% of the TC price ($92.1 out of $145 
per ton) is to cover the potential corn profit.  In contrast, 64.8% of the TC price ($49.9 out of $77 
per ton) on MDSU land is to cover the switchgrass production cost, while 35.2% of the TC price 
($27.1 out of $77 per ton) is to compensate for the corn profit.  On traditional croplands (WDFP 
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and WDLU), the potential gain from producing corn is more important than the switchgrass 
production cost in switchgrass tonnage contract price determination.  However, on marginal 
lands (MDSU and PDFP), the switchgrass production cost is the key determinant.   
 
                               
Figure 6    Percentages in TC Price from Switchgrass Cost and Corn Profit 
  
 
5.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 In this section, the impacts of the key factors, corn price forecast, switchgrass yield, corn 
yield and discount rate, on tonnage contracts are analyzed through sensitivity analysis. 
If the corn price decreases by 10%, the corn prices will be $4.91, $4.76, $4.59, $4.40, and 
$4.22 per bushel in each year from 2014 to 2018.  Table 21 shows the new switchgrass price 
estimation and percentage change after revising the corn price forecast.  For all four types of 
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landscapes, the switchgrass price decreases following the decrease in forecasted corn price.  On 
traditional croplands, the switchgrass contract prices decrease to $128 and $117 per ton for 
WDFP and WDLU or by 11.7% and 12.0% respectively.  The elasticities of corn price prediction 
on switchgrass TC price are 1.17 and 1.20 accordingly for WDFP and WDLU.  In contrast, the 
prices decrease to $67 and $80 per ton on MDSU and PDFP or by 13.0% and 14.0% 
respectively.  The elasticities of corn price prediction on MDSU and PDFP on the switchgrass 
TC prices are 1.30 and 1.40 accordingly.  All the elasticities are greater than 1 which indicates 
the percentage change in switchgrass TC price will be larger than the percentage change in 
predicted corn prices.  Moreover, the percentage changes on marginal lands are more than that 
on traditional croplands, though they are similar.  The biorefinery still prefers to sign contracts to 
purchase switchgrass from farmers on marginal lands, especially on MDSU lands, though the 
profits have increased for each type of landscapes. 
 
 
Table 21  Impact of 10% Decrease in Corn Price Forecast on Switchgrass TC Price and the 
Biorefinery’s Profit 
 
Landscapes 
New Switchgrass Price 
(dollars per ton) 
% Decrease in 
Switchgrass Price 
Biorefinery’s Profit* 
(in thousand dollars) 
WDFP 128 11.7 64.3 
WDLU 117 12.0 104.4 
MDSU 67 13.0 $272.9 
PDFP 80 14.0 $175.0 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
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When the switchgrass yield increases by 10%, the new switchgrass yield levels will be 
8.41, 9.16, 9.50, and 7.28 tons per acre for WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP respectively.  
Table 22 reports the impact of switchgrass yield increase on switchgrass TC prices.  The 
switchgrass price will decrease following the increase in switchgrass yield.  When the 
switchgrass yield increases by 10% on each type of land, the switchgrass price will decrease by 
5.5%, 6.0%, 3.9% and 3.2% with respect to WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP accordingly.  
The elasticities of switchgrass yield on switchgrass TC price will be 0.55, 0.60, 0.39, and 0.32 
for WDFP, WDLU, MDSU, and PDFP accordingly.  Compared to the switchgrass yield 
elasticities for capacity procurement contract, the impact of switchgrass yield on switchgrass 
tonnage contract price on MDSU and PDFP is much smaller.  The biorefinery’s profit will 
increase, but will not change the preference to contract with farmers on marginal lands. 
 
 
Table 22  Impact of 10% Increase in Switchgrass Yield on Switchgrass TC Price and the 
Biorefinery’s Profit 
 
Landscapes 
New Switchgrass Price 
(dollars per ton) 
% Decrease in 
Switchgrass Price 
Biorefinery’s Profit* 
(in thousand dollars) 
WDFP 137 5.5 41.5 
WDLU 125 6.0 85.8 
MDSU 74 3.9 272.9 
PDFP 90 3.2 165.2 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
 
If the corn yield decreases by 10%, the new corn yields levels will be 135 bushels per 
acre and 87 bushels per acre for traditional croplands and marginal lands accordingly.  Table 23 
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reports the switchgrass price change following the corn yield decrease.  On WDFP land, the 
switchgrass TC price will decrease from $145 to $128 per ton or 11.7%.  On WDLU land, the 
switchgrass price will decrease from $133 to $117 per ton or 12.0%.  On MDSU land, the 
switchgrass price will decrease from $77 to $67 per ton or 13.0%, while on PDFP land the 
switchgrass price will decrease from $93 to $80 per ton or 14.0%.  Therefore, the elasticities of 
corn yield on switchgrass tonnage contract will be 1.17, 1.20, 1.30, and 1.40.  All the corn yield 
elasticities are higher than 1 which means that the switchgrass TC price will decrease by a larger 
percentage than the decrease in corn yields.  The biorefinery will still prefer to choose to build a 
contractual relationship with farmers planting on MDSU and PDFP lands. 
 
 
Table 23  Impact of 10% Decrease in Corn Yield on Switchgrass TC Price and the 
Biorefinery’s Profit 
 
Landscapes 
New Switchgrass Price 
(dollars per ton) 
% Decrease in 
Switchgrass Price 
Biorefinery’s Profit* 
(in thousand dollars) 
WDFP 128 11.7 64.3 
WDLU 117 12.0 104.2 
MDSU 67 13.0 273.8 
PDFP 80 14.0 175.7 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
 
 
If the farmers believe that producing switchgrass is more risky than producing corn, the 
discount rate for switchgrass production will be higher than that for corn production.  Assuming 
the discount rate for the farmers to produce switchgrass is 10% while the discount rate for the 
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ethanol and corn production is still 8%, the new switchgrass tonnage contract can be re-
estimated.  Table 24 shows the switchgrass TC price and the biorefinery’s profit level on four 
landscapes under the 10% switchgrass production discount rate.  The switchgrass tonnage 
contract price will increase slightly following the increase in the switchgrass production discount 
rate.  Consequently, the biorefinery’s profit will decrease following the increase in the 
switchgrass tonnage contract price.  The biorefinery will still prefer to sign contracts with 
farmers on marginal lands.  Moreover, under 10% discount rate for switchgrass production, the 
biorefinery will not offer a contract with the farmers on WDFP land because the biorefinery will 
expect a negative profit from each contract. 
 
Table 24  Switchgrass TC Price and the Biorefinery’s Profit under 10% Discount Rate 
 
Landscapes 
Switchgrass Price 
(dollars per ton) 
% Increase in 
Switchgrass Price 
Biorefinery’s Profit* 
(in thousand dollars)  
WDFP 151 4.1 -3.9 
WDLU 139 4.2 36.2 
MDSU 79 2.3 234.3 
PDFP 96 2.5 136.4 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
 
 
5.5 Post Contract Risk Analysis 
 
5.5.1 Switchgrass Yield Risk under the Capacity Procurement Contract 
 After the farmers accept the switchgrass procurement contract, both the farmers and the 
biorefinery go into the post contract stage, in which the farmers will grow switchgrass and 
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provide the harvested switchgrass to the biorefinery for ethanol production.  Assuming the CPC 
price to be CPC , the biorefinery’s profit from each contract can be derived from the equation 
(51), which is, 
(68)                                 dteLLmsOMCtSE rt
T
CPCt

 0 1))((   
And the farmer’s overall profit during the contract lifespan can also be calculated to be 
(69)                                                   dteLc
T
rt
tCPC

0
11  
 After the contract has been signed, neither the farmers nor the biorefinery can alter the 
switchgrass contract price under either the capacity procurement contract or the acreage contract.  
If the switchgrass yield 1  were to decrease, under a capacity procurement contract, the 
biorefinery’s profit will decrease because the biorefinery will have less feedstock supply to 
produce ethanol (equation (68)).  The biorefinery’s total revenue decreases while costs remain 
relatively constant.  The farmers’ profit, however, will increase following the switchgrass yield 
decrease (equation (69)).  The switchgrass capacity procurement contract has locked the price 
paid to the farmers on the farmers’ entire land.  When the switchgrass yield decreases 
unexpectedly during the contract lifespan, the farmer’s cost on switchgrass production will 
decrease accordingly.  Therefore, the farmer’s switchgrass production profit will increase.  The 
impact of a 10% unexpected decrease in switchgrass yield on the biorefinery’s profit and 
farmer’s profit during the CPC lifespan is shown in Table 25.  On the other hand, when the 
switchgrass yield is unexpectedly high during the switchgrass CPC lifespan, the biorefinery’s 
profit will increase accordingly from equation (68) because the biorefinery then has more 
feedstock supply and therefore more ethanol production.  However, the farmers’ profit will 
suffer a decrease due to the fact that the switchgrass selling price has been locked at a low level 
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and the total production cost increases.  In both cases the biorefinery and the farmers’ profit will 
be affected by the unexpected switchgrass yield change under a capacity procurement contract 
but the biorefinery will be affected to a larger extent (Table 25). 
 
 
Table 25  Impact of 10% Decrease in Switchgrass Yield on the Biorefinery’s and the 
Farmer’s Profit at Post CPC Contract Stage 
 
 
Landscapes 
Contract Price 
(dollars per acre) 
% Decrease in 
Biorefinery’s 
Profit* 
% Increase in 
Farmer’s Profit 
Traditional Cropland 
WDFP 795 320.8 5.8 
WDLU 792 88.3 5.7 
Marginal Land 
MDSU 474 20.5 18.4 
PDFP 442 26.5 16.5 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
 
 
5.5.2 Switchgrass Yield Risk under the Tonnage Contract 
If the TC price is assumed to be TC , the biorefinery’s profit from each contract can be 
derived from the equation (64), which is, 
(70)                                 dteLLmsOMCtSE rt
T
tTCt

 0 11))((   
And the farmer’s overall profit without taking the opportunity cost on corn production during the 
contract lifespan can also be calculated to be 
(71)                                                   dteLc
T
rt
tTC

0
11   
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 Faced with the given tonnage contract price, both the farmer’s and the biorefinery’s profit 
will be affected by the unexpected switchgrass yield change.  For example, when the switchgrass 
yield decreases unexpectedly during the contract lifespan, the biorefinery’s profit will decrease 
accordingly (equation (70)), and the farmers’ profit will also decrease following the decrease in 
switchgrass yield.  The biorefinery’s profit decreases because the revenue decrease from ethanol 
production is larger than the switchgrass procurement cost decrease.  The farmers’ profit will 
decrease because the contract price only guarantees a per unit price of switchgrass; therefore, 
when the switchgrass yield decreases, the total revenue will also decrease.  Table 26 shows the 
percentage decreases in both the farmers’ and the biorefinery’s profits following the unexpected 
decrease in switchgrass yield during the contract lifespan.  The biorefinery’s profit change and 
the farmers’ profit percentage change will be the same as the switchgrass yield’s percentage 
change.  And the biorefinery’s profit will change in a smaller percentage under the tonnage 
contract compared the percentage change in the biorefinery’s profit change under the capacity 
procurement contract (Table 25 and Table 26).  This reveals that the biorefinery will be more 
willing to use the tonnage contract compared to the capacity procurement contract considering 
the post contract risks.  In most landscapes (WDFP, MDSU, and PDFP), the farmers’ profit risk 
with regard to the switchgrass yield change will also be smaller under the tonnage contract.  
However, the effects of the switchgrass yield change on farmers’ profit change are opposite 
between the capacity procurement contract and the tonnage contract.  When the switchgrass yield 
increases, both the biorefinery’s and the farmers’ profits will increase accordingly. 
 When the contractual relationship has been built between the biorefinery and the farmers, 
a potential risk also comes from the alternative land usage.  If the corn price or the corn yield 
increases unexpectedly, the farmer has to give up more to produce switchgrass.  However, from 
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equation (68) and (70), the biorefinery’s profit will not be affected by the corn production once 
the contract price has been specified under both the capacity procurement contract and the 
tonnage contract.  Therefore, only the farmers are faced with the risks from corn production 
returns. 
 
 
Table 26  Impact of 10% Decrease in Switchgrass Yield on the Biorefinery’s and the 
Farmer’s Profit at Post TC Contract Stage 
 
 
Landscapes 
Contract Price 
(dollars per ton) 
% Decrease in 
Biorefinery’s 
Profit* 
% Decrease in 
Farmer’s Profit 
Traditional Cropland 
WDFP 145 10 10 
WDLU 133 10 10 
Marginal Land 
MDSU 77 10 10 
PDFP 93 10 10 
* Discounted five-year profit from a contract on 133 acres of land 
 
 
Comparing Table 25 and Table 26, the biorefinery will be more willing to use a tonnage 
contract compared to a capacity procurement contract.  For example, on MDSU land, the 
biorefinery’s profit from each contract under a tonnage contract is the same as the estimated 
profit under a capacity procurement contract.  However, the biorefinery is subject to a higher risk 
with regard to the switchgrass yield under the capacity procurement contract.  Under the capacity 
procurement contract, the biorefinery pays the farmers a fixed amount of money based on the 
acres farmers used for planting switchgrass no matter how much switchgrass can be harvested 
that year.  On MDSU lands, the biorefinery pays each farmer $474 for each acre of land planted 
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to switchgrass.  However, in the first year, the yield of switchgrass will only be 14% of the 
maximum yield level.  Therefore, in the first year, the biorefinery may very well lose money 
from ethanol production because the supply of the switchgrass is too low.  In contrast, under the 
tonnage contract, the switchgrass is paid by each ton of switchgrass harvested.  Therefore, in the 
first year, when the switchgrass yield is low, the biorefinery’s expenditure on switchgrass in the 
first year is also low, which means that the biorefinery can adjust the procurement cost based on 
the switchgrass harvest condition.  And the biorefinery therefore is not necessarily losing money 
in the first year.  The overall risk faced by the biorefinery within the contract lifespan will thus 
be higher under the capacity procurement contract compared to the tonnage contract.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The on-farm production of biomass for ethanol production has been given more and more 
attention from farmers, policymakers and others.  Switchgrass has been identified as one of the 
most promising biomass feedstocks to be used to produce cellulosic ethanol.  Compared to 
traditional crops, switchgrass can be grown on various landscapes, including marginal lands.  
Much research has been done with regard to the economic feasibility of producing switchgrass.  
Most of the research focuses on the estimation of production costs or the breakeven prices.  The 
breakeven prices of switchgrass range from $46 to $94 per ton based on different environments 
where it is grown.  However, because the biomass market is not developed yet, the market price 
of switchgrass has not been given much attention. 
 In this thesis, a model is built combining both the biorefinery and the farmers in a 
contractual relationship.  Two procurement contract types have been discussed: the capacity 
procurement contract and the tonnage contract.  In a capacity procurement contract, the 
biorefinery pays the farmers a fixed price for each acre of land allocated towards switchgrass 
production.  In a tonnage contract, the biorefinery pays the farmer a price for each ton of 
switchgrass harvested.  Both the supply side and the demand side for switchgrass are considered.  
Corn is considered as an alternative crop for the farmers.  Because the switchgrass procurement 
contract covers the expectation of the biorefinery and the farmers for the next five years, the 
expected ethanol price and corn price for years 2014 through 2018 have been estimated using 
historical futures prices.  
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 Land quality and soil types also affect the yields and average costs of switchgrass 
production and corn production.  Therefore, the types of landscapes also affect the contract price 
of switchgrass.  Using west Tennessee as a case study, the contract prices under four types of 
landscapes are investigated based on Boyer et al. (2012): (i) a well-drained level upland 
(WDLU), (ii) a well- to moderately well-drained floodplain (WDFP), (iii) a moderate to 
somewhat poorly drained eroded sloping upland (MDSU), (iv) a poorly drained floodplain 
(PDFP).   
For the capacity procurement contract, the farm-gate switchgrass contract prices are 
$795, $792, $474, and $442 per acre for the switchgrass grown on WDLU, WDFP, MDSU and 
PDFP lands respectively.  Under the tonnage contract, the prices are $145, $133, $77, and $93 
per ton for the switchgrass grown on WDLU, WDFP, MDSU, and PDFP respectively.  The large 
price differences between the switchgrass grown on traditional croplands (WDLU and WDFP) 
and marginal lands (MDSU and PDFP) are largely due to the high yields and high recent market 
price of corn as an alternative crop that could be grown in place of switchgrass.  To maximize 
the profit, the biorefinery will prefer to sign contracts with the farmers growing switchgrass on 
marginal lands.  MDSU land is their top choice.   
 Sensitivity analysis is conducted on the capacity procurement contract prices and the 
tonnage contract prices on four aspects: corn price prediction, switchgrass yield prediction, corn 
yield prediction, and farmers’ discount rate.  The result reveals that a lower corn price and a 
lower corn yield will cause the CPC and TC prices to be lower, because the farmers’ corn profit 
will be lower following the decrease in corn price and yield prediction.  A higher farmers’ 
discount rate will cause the CPC and TC prices to be higher, because the farmers will require 
more compensation following the higher risk perception in the switchgrass production contract.  
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Under the capacity procurement contract, a higher switchgrass yield will cause the per acre 
contract price to be higher, because the switchgrass production costs will be higher.  On the other 
hand, under the tonnage contract, the per ton contract price will be lower when the switchgrass 
yield is higher because the farmers do not need as much profit per ton to keep the switchgrass 
profit equal to that from corn production.  In total, corn price and corn yield predictions have a 
higher impact on switchgrass contract prices compared to impact from switchgrass yield and 
farmers’ discount rate.   
Post contract sensitivity analysis with regard to a change in switchgrass yield or a change 
in corn price is also conducted in this study.  It reveals that a tonnage contract is preferred by the 
biorefinery compared to the capacity procurement contract.  The tonnage contract has more post 
contract risk advantage than the capacity procurement contract with regard to the unexpected 
change in switchgrass yield. 
 It is hard to project the corn price and ethanol price for a long time range, such as 10 
years.  A 5-year contract is discussed in this thesis.  The impact of economies of scale for both 
the farmers and the biorefinery can be considered in future studies.  Changes in technology will 
also affect the profitability of the biorefinery.  Transportation costs could be used as variable 
based on distance.  In this study, switchgrass dry matter loses in transportation and storage were 
not considered as a function of either type of switchgrass bale or type of storage used.  Future 
research can also incorporate other alternative land uses besides corn production.  Soybeans, 
cotton, hay, and livestock can be considered as the alternative choices for the farmers.  It will 
refine the farmers’ decision process if more alternatives are considered.  
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A.1 Schwartz (1997) Two-Factor Model  
Based on the Efficient Market theory proposed by Fama (1965), the commodity price can 
be assumed having incorporated all the available information by that time.  Assume the 
commodity spot price of commodity  ( ) follows the stochastic process (Gibson and Schwartz 
1990; Schwartz 1997): 
(A.1.1)                                    11)( SdzSdtdS    
where   denotes the long run log price, 1  is the volatility term, and 1dz  describes a Brownian 
motion.    denotes the instantaneous convenience yield (cost-of-carry) which can be interpreted 
as the flow of services accruing to the holder of the commodity sellers but not to the holder of a 
futures contract.  Fabozzi et al. (2009) explained the convenience yield as: 
“… It is in the futures market that investors send a collective message about how any new 
information is expected to impact the cash market.  … the futures price and the cash 
market are tied together by the cost of carry.  If the futures price deviates from the cash 
market price by more than the cost of carry, arbitrageurs … would pursue a strategy to 
bring them back into line.  Arbitrage is the mechanism that assures that the cash market 
price will reflect the information that has been collected in the futures market.”  (Fabozzi 
et al. 2009) 
The convenience yield is defined to be “the flow of services which accrue to the owner of 
a physical inventory but not to the owner of a contract for future delivery” by Brennan (1991).  It 
is also assumed to follow a stochastic process: 
(A.1.2)                                      22)( dzdtd    
where   denotes the speed of mean reversion to the long run mean log price  , 2  is the 
volatility term, and 2dz  describes a Brownian motion.  Furthermore, assume  
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(A.1.3)                                              dtdzdz 21  
The change in commodity convenience yield d  has two components: a systematic 
change dt)(    and a random change 22dz .  The systematic percentage change in 
commodity price is the change that can be predicted from the current commodity price which is 
negatively related to the current commodity price.  This inverse relationship between the future 
price expectation and current price level is the “mean-reverting” property.  The second term in 
equations (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) represents the random change in commodity price.  The Brownian 
motion accounts for all the unavailable information and unknown factors in commodity futures 
price determination.  The randomness comes from Brownian motion’s property that unexpected 
change in future commodity price and convenience yield is independent of the price change at 
any earlier time.   
Defining )log(SX  , and applying Itō’s lemma12,   
dSdS
S
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dS
S
X
dt
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12
 Itō's lemma is used to find the differential of a time-dependent function of a stochastic process, because 
derivatives cannot be obtained from stochastic process.  Let  (   ) be a function for which the partial derivatives 
  (   ),   (   ), and    (   ) are defined and continuous, and let  ( ) be a Brownian motion.  Then, for each   
 ,  (   ( ))   (   ( ))  ∫   (   ( ))  
 
 
 ∫   (   ( ))  
 
 
 
 
 
∫    (   ( ))    
 
 
.  For Brownian motion 
 ( ),        , and        (Shreve 2004). 
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Therefore, the log spot commodity price can be characterized as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
stochastic process
13
: 
(A.1.4)                                 11
2
1
2
1
dzdtdX  





  
Since convenience yield risk cannot be hedged, the risk-adjusted convenience yield process will 
have a market price of risk associated with it (Schwartz 1997).  Under equivalent martingale 
measure, equations (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) can be rewritten as 
(A.1.5)                                       
*
11)( SdzSdtrdS    
 (A.1.6)                                      *22)( dzdtd    
 (A.1.7)                                                dtdzdz 
*
2
*
1  
 is the market price of risk (assumed constant) and 
*
1dz  and 
*
2dz  are the increments to the 
Brownian motion under the equivalent martingale measure. 
 Futures prices then must satisfy the partial differential equation (Gibson and Schwartz 
1990): 
(A.1.8)         0
2
1
2
1 2
221
22
1  TSSSS FFSFrFSFFS    
subject to the terminal boundary condition   SSF 0,, .   
Bjerksund (1991) has shown that the solution to equation (A.1.8) is 
(A.1.9)                             






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1
exp, TA
e
STSETSF
T



 
Or,  
                                                 
13
 An Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process,  , satisfies the following stochastic differential equation:     (   )   
   , where    ,   and     are parameters and    denotes the Wiener process (or Brownian motion).   
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■ 
A.2 Derivation of Equations (9) and (10) (Schwartz and Smith (2000)) 
Let ntt / , then equations (6) and (7) can be written as 
ttt Qxcx  1  
where  
  tttx      
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10
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t  1 , and t  is a vector of serially uncorrelated, normally distributed distribution matrix 
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0)( tE   
and  









tt
tt
t 2
221
21
2
1)var(


  
112 
 
Therefore, the n-step ahead mean vector nm  and variance-covariance matrix nV  can be given 
recursively as: 
(A.2.1)                            1 nn Qmcm   and  )var(1 tnn QQVV    
It can be shown that  
(A.2.2)                                           tnm nn  00  
and 
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, when n approaches infinity, n  
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te   and n2  approaches te 2 .  Then, 
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Equations (9) and (10) can be obtained by substituting (A.2.3) into (A.2.1). 
■ 
 
A.3 State Space Form and Kalman Filter 
In this section, only basic theory of Kalman Filter is demonstrated.  More formal and 
complete discussion on Kalman Filter can be found in Harvey (1989) (Chapter 3), Hamilton 
(1994) (Chapter 13), Brockwell and Davis (2002) (Chapter 8), Durbin and Koopman (2012) 
(Chapter 2 and 4), and West and Harrison (1997). 
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A.3.1 State Space Form 
The state space form describes a dynamic estimation system.  Let ty  be a multivariate 
time series vector containing n elements.  ty  is observable and is related to a 1m  vector tx  via 
an observation equation: 
(A.3.1)                                               ttttt dxZy   
where tZ  is an mn  matrix, td  is an 1n  vector and t  is an 1n  vector of serially 
uncorrelated disturbance with mean zero and covariance matrix tH , that is, 
(A.3.2)                                         0)( tE    and  tt H)var(  
To put equation (A.3.1) under the Gaussian process framework, assume t  is normally 
distributed, that is, 
(A.3.3)                                                     ),0(~ tt HN  
When 1n , the observation equation (A.3.1) can be written as an univariate model: 
(A.3.4)                                                ttttt dxZy 

  
where tZ  is an 1m  vector, and  
(A.3.5)                                                       ),0(~ tt hN                     
 In general, the unknown state vector tx  is assumed to be generated via a Markov process: 
(A.3.6)                                               tttttt RcxTx  1  
where tT  is an mm  matrix, tc  is an 1m  vector, tR  is an pm  matrix, and t  is a 1p  
vector of serially uncorrelated Gaussian disturbance, that is, 
(A.3.7)                                                      ),0(~ tt QN  
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Equations (A.3.1) and (A.3.6) together construct the state space representation.  Three 
more assumptions are needed to analyze the state space model: 
0)( 

stE   
0)( 1 

xE t  
0)( 1 

xE t  
for all Tts ,,2,1,   .  1x  is the initial state vector.  These assumptions mean that td  provides 
no more information about stx   for s = 0, 1, … besides that contained in 1ty , and the initial state 
vector is uncorrelated with any realizations of t  and t . 
 
A.3.2 Kalman Filter 
 Consider the state space model of equations (A.3.1) and (A.3.6).  Let jix |  denote the 
optimal estimation of ix  based on all the information up to and including jy , e.g. 
 11| ,,| yyyxEx ttttt   
 1211| ,,| yyyxEx ttttt    
Let jiP|  denote the mm  covariance matrix of the estimated error based on the information set 
 11,, yyyY jjj  , e.g. 
  



  tttttttt xxxxEP |||  
  



   1|1|1| tttttttt xxxxEP  
When ty  is available, the estimator of tx , 1| ttx , can be updated: 
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(A.3.8)                                 ttttttttttttt dxZyFZPxx 

 

 1|
1
1|1||  
 (A.3.9)                                      1|
1
1|1|| 



 ttttttttttt PZFZPPP  
where  
(A.3.10)                                               tttttt HZPZF 

 1|  
Substituting equation (A.3.8) into equation (A.3.6), the prediction of unobserved variable 
in the next stage is, 
  11|11|1|11|1|1  


 

 ttttttttttttttttttt cdxZyFZPxTcxTx  
This equation can be simplified as 
(A.3.11)                        tttttttttttt dKcyKxZKTx   11|1|1  
where  
(A.3.12)                                           
1
1|1



 tttttt FZPTK  
The recursion for the covariance matrix is  
(A.3.13)                







  

 11111|
1
1|1|1|1 tttttttttttttttt RQRTPZFZPPTP  
And the prediction for 1ty  at time t is 
(A.3.14)                                             1|11|1   tttttt dxZy  
tty |1  can be obtained by substituting equation (A.3.11) into equation (A.3.14).  The Kalman 
filter is started with the unconditional mean and variance of 1x  (Hamilton 1994): 
(A.3.15)                                                      )( 10|1 xEx   
 (A.3.16)                                       



  0|110|110|1 xxxxEP  
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The group of equations from (A.3.8) to (A.3.16) constructs the algorithm of Kalman Filter 
recursion process.  The Figure 7 illustrates the process more intuitively: 
 
 
Figure 7    The Recursion Process of Kalman Filter 
 
 
The formal derivation of Kalman filter can be found in Harvey (1989), page 109 - 110. 
 
A.3.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
The theory of maximum likelihood estimation is based on T sets of observations, 
 11,, yyyY jjj  .  The probability density function can be written as: 
(A.3.17)                                             


T
t
ttt YyPYL
1
1|;  
where   denotes all the unknown parameters involved in the state space model, and  1| tt YyP  
denotes the probability of ty  conditional on all the information received till time 1t , 1tY . 
 Rewrite the observation equation (A.3.1) as 
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(A.3.18)                                 tttttttttt dxxZxZy   1|1|  
The conditional expected value and variance of ty  at time 1t  can then be calculated from 
equation (A.3.18): 
(A.3.19)                                        tttttttt dxZyyE   1|1|1  
 (A.3.20)                                       tttttttt FHZPZy 

  1|1var  
Therefore, the log likelihood function can be written as 
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where 1|  tttt yyv .  Let  
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Then, 
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log  .  Differentiating t  with respect to the ith element of , 
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It can be rewritten as 
(A.3.23)                             tt
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where I is the identity matrix.  The first order derivative of the log likelihood function can be 
obtained: 
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The Maximum Likelihood Estimators can be derived while assuming 0
log



i
L

, for all 
n,i ,2,1   .  The numerical method to evaluate the parameters can be found in Harvey (1989), 
Chapter 3.  The gradient vector at the maximum likelihood estimates can be presented as 


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L
G  
 The information matrix plays a very important role in calculating the covariance matrix 
of maximum likelihood estimators.  Differentiating the equation (A.3.23), with respect to the jth 
element of  , j , gives, 
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Therefore, the ij-th element of the information matrix can be written as 
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Denoting the information matrix as H, then the information matrix at the maximum likelihood 
estimates can be presented as 
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The covariance matrix can be calculated as: 
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  1ˆˆvar  H  
which is a nn  matrix.  Hamilton (1994) showed that under certain conditions, quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimates give consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the true value of  , 
with 
   )ˆvar(,0ˆ  NL                                               ■ 
 
 
A.4 Derivation of Equation (54) 
Substituting the expected corn price equation (35) into switchgrass price equation (52), 
the switchgrass price can be written as 
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which is equation (54).  When T , and 0
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Therefore, the switchgrass price will converge to  
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